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This thesis focuses on the geopolitical thinking of the Russian Federation in the Arctic areas, espe-
cially as it pertains to the role of the modernization of the Russian economy and to the importance
of the sea in world politics. The aim is to contribute to the better understanding of Russia’s arctic
politics and to the different actors in Russia through using Critical Discourse Analysis to study Rus-
sian official and political discourses. Moreover the focus is to scrutinize, how Russian geopolitical
thinking constructs the Arctic and how the Russian geopolitical thinking relates to John Agnew’s
concept of modern geopolitical imagination.
Russia’s politics towards the Arctic, or more precisely, the success of those policies will determine
the future for this energy-dependent state. According to John Agnew’s concepts of modern geopo-
litical imagination, Russia views the Arctic as natural and sovereign part of the country. Russian
geopolitical thinking in the north closely relates to the geopolitical and national interests of the
country. Discourses traced in the research material were discourse on modernization, on country’s
sovereign rights and on cooperation. In addition, the Arctic appears to be the strategic treasure trove
for the country, which secures the future economic growth and sustainable stability. Simultane-
ously, the political leaders have often emphasized the demand for the modernization and the need to
get rid of the energy revenues as a fundamental guarantee of the development of the country. Over-
all, the Arctic has served as a useful identity-building project, especially as a platform to reinforce a
great power mentality.
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11. Introduction
Russia's equal position in world politics and maintaining its sovereignty in the chang-
ing world has been at the core of Russian political argumentation since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The most powerful person in Russian politics during the last decade, Vladimir Putin, de-
scribed in 2005 that the Soviet break-up was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th cen-
tury”1. Further the question of the geopolitical belongingness of Russian Federation has been dis-
cussed. Moreover, a plausible defence establishment and the modernization process have also been
Russia’s top priorities. Many scholars have stated that Russia has been in a quest for gaining its
great power (velikaya derzhava) status back2.
Russia is geographically the largest country in the world and plays an important role
in the regional and global energy market. With the growing energy prices the attention has also
turned to the natural resources in the Arctic areas. In addition, the Arctic became more “heated”
with the evidence that global warming is shrinking polar ice and opening up new shipping lanes in
the high north. The Arctic region covers one fifth of the planet’s landmass and has potential in
many spheres. Russia is an Arctic country; about 70 percent of the Russia’s landmass is located in
northern latitudes, extending from Russia’s land border with Norway to the Bering Strait and to the
Russian coast of Pacific ocean in the Far East. Therefore Russia holds a key role in international
debate over the Arctic and its future prospects.
Simultaneously with the aroused interest also possibility for a dispute over the
governance and control in the Arctic has become more agitated. In 2010 Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev held a Security Council meeting concentrating on prevention of possible national
security threats arising from the global climate change. The president stated that developing the
Arctic is crucial to Russia's future. Further he demanded Russia to designate its territory and sea-
areas in the Arctic.3 Consequently Russia has been in a quest of claiming a large share of the
region's mineral resources, which are located in the sea bed of the Russian Arctic, in the continental
shelf4. The debate and future prospects on global warming and the possibilities in the Arctic in
reference to the natural resources, as well as the unsolved situation in the territories of the Arctic
1 Putin 2005.
2 See e.g. Kanet 2007, Neumann 2008a and Oldberg 2010.
3 Medvedev 2010.
4 The ownership and borderlines of the Arctic continental shelf is unsettled. More in chapter 5.2.1.
2suggest that the role of the sea in world politics has altered. The global warming and the growing
significance of the Arctic areas also effect to the perception of Russia in reference to its
belongingness or in its geopolitical thinking.
Russia’s growing interest to the Arctic has also influenced the topical theme of mod-
ernization in Russia. Modernization has recently specially referred to the economic modernization
of the country; to edge the economy from Soviet type of planned mass production to innovative and
modern high-tech. Nonetheless, a question remains; what does a country whose economy and thus
basic functions of society are based on strong state, authoritarian-type of “sovereign democracy”
and budget revenues on energy do in times of energy possibly becoming scarcer and the energy in-
dustry requiring for a new, modernized infrastructure? During the past years, 50 % of Russia’s
budget income has become from the oil and gas sectors. Out of all exports of the country, 70% is
raw material, out of which half is going to the EU countries.5 Russia is currently still reliant on the
oil and gas fields, which have been exploited already during the Soviet times.
The interest to the new resource-rich areas in the north has been articulated; in 2008
president Medvedev named the Arctic as a future strategic base for natural resources. Another goal
has been to preserve Russia’s role as a leading arctic power6. During the last few years Russia has
carried out several impressive acts to proclaim more authority at sea. For example several expedi-
tions have been carried out in the Arctic sea and the Lake Baikal. In addition, the tasks assigned to
the naval forces of the Russian Federation (Voyenno-Morskoj flot, VMF) have received new types
of tasks. Since 2006 Navy has secured Russia's energy sources at the Arctic regions and conducted
surveillance of the existing infrastructure for the energy exports, such as the Nord Stream7. These
events suggest that the role of the sea might be changing in contemporary world politics. It is thus
interesting to probe how such changes are reflected in the Russian geopolitical thinking.
The starting point for this paper is that the geopolitical thinking of the Russian
Federation since the Soviet break-up has been subject to change.  Further this thesis focuses on the
Russian geopolitical thinking on the Arctic areas, which have been recently drawing attention from
the international community. I have chosen to study geopolitics as a discursive practise; how
5Economy Watch 2010.
6Arctic paper 2008.
7Rosbalt 2009.
3Russian geopolitical thinking is constructed and represented. What type of discourses can be traced
in the Russian geopolitical thinking? In reference to the Arctic, how is the modernization process
represented?
The thesis follows the tradition of critical geopolitics, in which the geographical space
is perceived as a product of political and cultural thinking rather than something ‘natural’ or
‘objective’. Moreover the focus is to scrutinize, how Russian geopolitical thinking constructs the
Arctic and how the Russian geopolitical thinking relates to the concept by John Agnew; modern
geopolitical thinking. According to Agnew, long before the academic discipline of geopolitics was
developed, there was a certain way of thinking geopolitically and understanding the spatially of
power.8
The goal of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of Russia as an actor
in world politics. This paper is relevant due to the fact that Russia is significant actor in the Arctic,
but its Arctic politics have not been extensively studied. The growing interest towards the Arctic by
Russia and by other arctic states will be defining the future development in the area. Whether the
future is cooperation, confrontation or something else, it is crucial to have understanding and stand-
points on the politics of the Russian Federation.
The research material can be divided into two categories; firstly the official statements
of Russian political elite and policy papers relating to the Arctic. Secondly, the material from politi-
cal commentators and officers will be examined9. Studying Russian geopolitical thinking according
to these two types of data sources reveals a new, wider look on Russia’s geopolitical thinking and
policy towards the Arctic region. Lastly, the goal is to investigate how the Arctic debate relates to
the modernization process of the Russian Federation.
The next chapter outlines the historical and present approaches to the Russian North
as a domestic and international space and examines some features of the ongoing debate over the
Arctic. This is followed by an introduction to the northern military presence, which is one of the
issues driving attention to the north. The chapter following the introduction outlines the theory of
critical geopolitics. Then the methodology of critical discourse analysis will be presented. After that
8 More about Modern Geopolitical Thinking in chapter 4.
9 More about the data demarcation process and research data in chapter 3.
4the actual analysis of the research data will be performed, followed by discussion and lastly, the
concluding remarks.
1.1 The Arctic Debate
The debate over the importance of the Arctic and its potential has become more in-
tense during the recent years with the research results indicating that the polar ice is shrinking in-
creasingly fast. In winter conditions the Arctic is under a thick layer of ice, but the summer and
navigable season in the areas closer to the world’s northeast shores is getting longer each year. The
north became important during the Soviet times; it was the area rich in natural resources. In the
1960s Russia first started exploiting vast oil fields in the Siberia. Even today a major part of the oil
and gas Russia is producing comes from these fields. On this account the natural resources in the
Arctic are crucial for the country’s future, considering that the economic growth during the recent
years in Russia is based on petro-revenues. Furthermore a concept of ‘mastering the north’ (osvoe-
nie severa) played a corresponding role in the planned economy. The north (Russkij sever) has al-
ways been occupying a crucial role in the Russian discourse, both in public and elite level10. In ad-
dition, the term Russian north11 has been said to contain a perception of the (geopolitical) discourse
of the importance of the region to the Russia/Soviet Union.
The concept of Arctic refers to the area surrounding the North Pole; usually it is
thought to be the areas north of the Arctic Circle (66° 33'N). Even though the definition of the Arc-
tic Circle might consider being artificial, it is simultaneously clear to all parties. This area contains
the Arctic Ocean and parts of Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and
the United States. Further when talking about the Arctic five, it means the five riparian countries of
the Arctic Ocean. Although the concepts of the Arctic and the high north are used quite freely, it is
important to note that the concepts are not exact synonyms; moreover the usage of these words var-
ies across different languages, national discourses and international arenas.
The Russian Arctic is thought to include the northern parts of mainland Russia, undis-
puted territorial waters and Russia’s border claims in the far north with unsolved and contested
status. In the Arctic Strategy of Russian Federation (2010) the Arctic zone of the country (Ark-
10 See eg. Baev 2009, Blakkisrud 2006.
11 This is only applicable when talking about the term in Russian and to the Russian audience.
5ticheskaya zona Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, AZRF) was defined to include oblasts of Murmansk and
Archangelsk, Krasnoyarsk krai, Autonomous Okrugs of Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets and Chukotka and
lastly, the republic of Yakutia.
Russia is the largest country in the world in total area. To add to this, when looking at
the population in the high north about the half of the inhabitants of the Arctic areas are Russian.
Russia is, and wants to be perceived as, a pre-eminent Arctic great power12. Nevertheless, as the
CIA world fact book states, it is “unfavourably located in relation to the major sea lanes of the
world”13. One has to bear in mind that transport in the Arctic and in the Baltic Sea is growing rap-
idly year after another and due to the climate change the all-year icecap in the Arctic Ocean will in
the future diminish. The prolongation in the navigable season will ensure a greater attention to the
Arctic and especially to the Northern Sea Route (whose sovereignty is asserted by Russia). New
shipping lanes would revolutionize the global maritime infrastructure. With the new sea lanes cargo
from Europe to Asia could avoid the politically volatile Middle East and the piracy of the coasts of
Africa.
The Arctic is furthermore known as the treasure trove of natural resources and already
today much of the gas produced in Russia comes from the bordering areas of the Arctic. According
to US Geological Survey, the Arctic could potentially have 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil,
20% of undiscovered natural gas liquids and about 30% of yet unfound natural gas14. Besides the
energy resources, arctic areas are also rich in other resources like minerals, game, fish, fresh water
and if the subarctic is included, forest. Add to this the arctic nature with its extreme and vulnerable
conditions and the indigenous people of the north, their lives and sources of livelihood are depend-
ing on the surrounding nature as has been the case since the beginning of times.
Currently approximately 40% of the world’s population is without safe drinking wa-
ter. Two thirds of the global fresh water is ice, so a lot of this resource lies in the North Pole15. The
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea grants “sovereign rights for the purpose of ex-
ploring and exploiting...natural resources” over a 200 nautical miles exclusive zone from the
12Around two million Russian nationals live in the area north of Arctic circle 66°66’N.
13The CIA world fact book 2009.
14US Geological Survey 2008.
15Wikipedia; Water Politics.
6coast.16 This gives Russia a notable maritime presence beyond its northernmost territory. Further-
more, if a country wants to apply for an extension in its exclusive zone, it has to offer evidence. Ac-
cording to the Law of the Sea, a “natural prolongation of land territory”17, such as the continental
shelf, can be a reason to extend the economic zone beyond the 200 nautical mile limit. While reli-
able knowledge of the natural resources and the ownership of the continental shelf in the Arctic are
still missing, Russia has been active in committing expeditions and collecting support to its claims
in the Arctic. To conclude, this study will inspect how the historical discourse of the Russian north
relates to the contemporary geopolitical thinking in the Arctic.
1.2 Northern Military Presence
During the Tsarist and Soviet times, the naval forces of the country were a matter of
honour. Furthermore, the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy has been present in the north since
World War II. After the war the Soviet fleet was commanded by Admiral Gorshkov, who predicted
that the future warfare would be solved with modern submarines.18 During the war the German fleet
had used the fjords in Norway as bases for its submarines and therefore offered a useful example for
the Soviet Union. After the war Soviet fleet programmes were set to create an effective submarine
fleet. In 1950’s the new, nuclear-based power gave the submarines new reliability and made them
truly capable of independent operation below the surface of the water. As strongholds the fleet
would have the Murmansk fjord and the northern coastline.
During the Cold War the Soviet Navy was built up to be the second biggest naval
force in the world, moreover it had an extensive monitoring system that kept the Kremlin updated,
specially on the presence of US and NATO vessels in the international waters. The strategic impor-
tance of the northern waters grew simultaneously with the Cold War politics; the USA and the So-
viet Union were geographically closest to each other in the northeast areas. Moreover the Northern
Fleet has in military-strategic meaning important mission in country’s military strategy; the Ballis-
tic missile submarines are important in the so-called nuclear triad. The Arctic and the Barents Sea
16 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, Part V, especially Articles 55-7. The ‘baseline’
is defined under Part 2, Article 5 as ‘the low-water line along the coast.’
17 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982: “The continental shelf of a coastal State com-
prises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolon-
gation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does
not extend up to that distance.”
18 Gorshkov 1975, 192-198.
7have been said to be the most militarized spaces in the Cold War world19. Russian north further
gained importance in the Soviet Union with the shipbuilding and maritime industry concentrating to
the area. Also relating to the Soviet military-industry, many factories were set up to the Arctic re-
gion. Especially Murmansk oblast developed good infrastructure and connections to the other parts
of the country and thus the peripheral north had become one of the most strategically important war
industrial areas. In addition to the military-industry, many natural resources, such as nickel, iron,
oil, gas and coal, were treated in the area. After the Soviet Union seized to exist many of the mili-
tary bases and most of the nuclear submarines were not maintained properly and their condition
gradually deteriorated. When the arms race calmed down, also the military-industry of the Russian
north drifted into trouble.20
In the Soviet break-up Russia also lost many strategically important coast lines and
ports. Additionally, many vessels were no longer owned by Russia. The Cold War was a powerful
frame of reference, which had appointed the strategic significance of regions such as the Arctic.
Since then times have changed. In comparison with the 1970’s and 1980’s, the present state of the
Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy is modest and many vessels are deteriorating, including the nu-
clear reactors on board its submarines21.
The Kursk disaster befell the Russia armed forces in August 2000. This nuclear-
powered submarine was reported to be missing in Barents Sea, 60 km north of the Russian port of
Severomorsk. Within a few hours when the first news reports were published, it became obvious
that a catastrophic accident had occurred. Notwithstanding the human tragedy, attention was also
drawn to the potential nuclear disaster. The event soon gained attention in international media.
Shortly a question was asked from the Russian side; was there another vessel involved? In the fol-
lowing days there were failed attempts to rescue the crew. Many countries offered help and special
rescue equipment. The help was then accepted from Norwegian and British experts, but it was too
late.22
The disaster was followed by accusation and criticism towards Russian actors. A Brit-
ish newspaper concluded that “The Kursk disaster was not just a terrible human drama, but a meta-
19 Dodds 2003,205.
20 More about strategic importance of the Russian north, e.g. Rowe 2009.
21 E.g. Åtland 2011.
22 Timelines of the event in media: e.g. RIA 2005, BBC 2000.
8phor for the decline of a superpower and for the decay of Russia’s armed forces23” It was suggested
that misdirected sense of pride and fear of foreign navies using disaster to gather intelligence were
reasons for Russia’s reluctance to invite outside help24. Claims of Russia's attitude being still based
on Cold War conceptions were common. Partly due to the media writing and criticism, newly
elected President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, was forced to make an ignominious apology on behalf
of the armed forces. In the same speech he vowed to rebuild Russian Military25.
The event was even described to denote the state of Russian armed forces, since the
Kursk catastrophe was not the only accident, but gained international attention. According to some
scholars, the Accident became a symbol of Russia's capability to maintain or regain its status as a
great power.26 It can thus be stated, that after the year 2000 more actions were carried out to reaf-
firm Russia’s status as an important actor in international politics and particularly ensure the capa-
bility to operate in the future credibly. President Putin started by suspending high rank officers and
gave speeches to convince his willingness to act. Among others, a year after the Kursk strategy a
new strategy paper was released, concentrating on the naval issues of the Russian Federation27.
Russia has since 2000 also started rebuilding its naval forces and improved the profile
of the Navy not just in the Arctic, but also in the Baltic Sea. One reason for the growing activities in
the northern waters is to secure the natural sources.28 Further not only the military fleet, but also the
polar fleet of ice-breakers and other commercial and scientific vessels are a part of the moderniza-
tion programmes of the country.
It is thus legitimate to argue that after the year 2000, with new president in the office,
there has been change in the geopolitical (and great power) discourses. This paper will contemplate
how the change has affected the geopolitical thinking of the Russian federation. Russian engage-
ment in the High North, both domestically and internationally, plays against the background of geo-
political, political and social change in Russia. In contrast to the militarization of the Arctic space
during the Cold War, the immediate post-Soviet years were greeted with high levels of cooperation
in the North with environmental, social and military issues. Today, the opening shipping lanes and
23 Dodds 2003,204.
24 Dodds 2003, 205.
25 E.g. Vomack 2000. BBC 2000.
26 Dodds 2003,204.
27 Maritime Doctrine 2000.
28 Rosbalt 2009.
9the potential natural resources of the Arctic is again drawing attention towards the north. At this
time the attention can be seen not just local among the arctic actors, but gaining a global character.
Accordingly, this research will scrutinize the Russian geopolitical thinking through
different kinds of material and thus generate an overall picture based on the significance of the
themes introduced earlier. The next chapter will introduce the concept of this study more specifi-
cally.
2 Background to the Research Problem
The structure of this chapter is as follows: The first section will providing insights into
the previous research made on the Russian geopolitical thinking. The second section will introduce
the research task and the scope of the study. Finally, in the last section the research questions will be
introduced.
2.1 Previous research; the Soviet Dissolution and the Rise of Geopolitical Thinking
The research over Russia’s geopolitical belongingness has gained popularity during
recent years among the scholars of International Relations and political science. Consequently insti-
tutes of strategic and geopolitical studies, scholars of geography, history and military studies, jour-
nals of academic and policy-relevant geopolitics have been proliferating in Russia since the disinte-
gration of Soviet Union. By the same token the states have started to show interest towards the Arc-
tic and therefore a growing amount of policy papers and strategies have been released. Besides Rus-
sia, also Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and USA have published their Arctic strategies29.
After many decades of International Relations and geopolitics being ‘bourgeois’ and
‘highly reactionary’ science in the Soviet Union, in today’s Russia geopolitics is back sublimely.
The previous research over the geopolitical thinking in Russian Federation has been divided in this
chapter into several categories, which are presented in more detail below.
29 Russia has published a document in 2008 with the title “The fundamentals of Russian state policy in the Arctic up to
2020 and beyond”, which is considered to be the strategy paper on Arctic issues. In 2010 Russia also published a
Development Strategy focusing on its Arctic Regions. European Union also might be publishing an Arctic paper in the
future.
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Firstly and quantitatively the biggest category is the Russian research (in Russia and
elsewhere) over Russia’s geopolitical belongingness in the Post-Soviet space. This category in-
cludes the research made under IR and political science, but also in military-strategic studies.
Moreover in Russia there is a large number of “semi” or non-scholar, popular literature about the
geopolitical orientation and history of the country.
The second category is the (mostly) 'western’ research over the Russian geopolitical
orientation and research. This category also encompasses the research made over the discourses of
Russian political actors and their argumentation, over the Russian identity and public opinion.
The third category is the growing research interest to the geopolitics of the Arctic and
the future prospects of the high north. Historically this category has mainly been about the envi-
ronmental factors, such as the vulnerability of the arctic nature, but recently energy politics, future
governance of the region, the natural resources and ethnographical (and social) studies of indige-
nous people in the far north have gained popularity. In addition, the study of the possible effects of
the climate change, the security aspects and the future cooperation in the Arctic have been studied.
This thesis relates to all three categories linking them together in relevant parts. The
Russian research origin is not used widely largely due to the fact that it is not part of the school of
International Relations and more than being an academic research, most of it can be referred to as
non-scientific, popular literature.
In addition to the geopolitical orientation, also the Russian identity has been studied.
Especially since the Soviet times Russian academia, policymakers as well as the media concentrated
on how to characterize the borders and the entity of the new Russia. Russian IR-scholar Andrei
Tsygankov argues that the Soviet disintegration contributed to a great sense of cultural trauma,
which has since produced a high degree of contestation in the geopolitical discourse of the contem-
porary Russia30. He goes on that the post-Soviet geography is being reconstituted as a result of dis-
cursive strategies chosen by the Russian intellectual and political elites, instead of any fixed or
‘natural’ geopolitical interests. Also some of the statements by the political elite conclude that chal-
lenges that Russia had to face after the dismantling of the Soviet Union were largely not just social,
but geopolitical in nature. To add to this, it has been argued that Russia views the Arctic as a com-
30 Tsygankov 2003,103.
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pensation of the losses in its neighbourhood after the collapse of the Soviet Union31 the ongoing
conflicts in the post-Soviet space have partly been triggering resurgence in literature concentrating
on the geopolitical thinking.32
Russian geopolitical orientation has been studied both from inside and outside of its
borders. Based on his study Tsygankov suggested that geopolitics could offer possible solutions and
answers to the unstable condition of the Russian state. The internal challenges resulting from the
dismantling of the Soviet regime as well as the conflicts on the country’s periphery would be best
resolved by constructing an overarching geopolitical vision and strategy, rather than solving the
problems one by one on an ad hoc basis. Further he saw that the Soviet break-up did not end the era
of Russian political elite and academia viewing the problems and challenges in terms of a wider
geopolitical thinking.33
The most well-known Russian geopolitical thinker at the moment is Alexander Dugin,
who has been politically active and strongly involved in the so-called Eurasian movement.34. Out-
side Russia, e.g. Dmitry Trenin and Andrei Tsygankov write about Russian geopolitics. Some other
Russian speacialist on geopolitics include Kamaludin Gadzhiyev, Vladimir Kolosov, Nikolai Mi-
ronenko and Nikolai Nartov35.  The Russian geopolitics has been studied outside Russia during the
recent years by e.g. John O’Loughlin, Gearoid Ò Tuathail, and Alan Ingram, along with, Vladimir
Kolossov, D. Kerr and in Tampere University by Sirke Mäkinen. Many of the current research pro-
jects about Russia concentrate on the energy politics and Russia’s relations towards ‘the West’,
whereas Russian geopolitical writing usually concentrates on Russia itself and mostly uses the tradi-
tional geopolitical orientation36.
Besides the energy and the security aspects of the high north, also the environmental
and human prospects are gaining more prominence, including the future deposits and arrangements
for the nuclear waste in the Arctic areas and the questions concerning the indigenous people of the
north and their living conditions. In the field of International Relations also the governance and fu-
ture scenarios are in the focus of many current research projects, such as in Pami Aalto's project on
31 Blunden 2009,122.
32 E.g. Tsygankov 2003, 102.
33 Tsygankov 2003,2.
34 More in detail in chapter 4.
35 More in chapter 4.
36 More in chapter 4.
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the sustainable energy in Russia. Furthermore, the Arctic has been recently studied from the point
of geopolitics by Norwegian Pavel K. Baev, who is specialized in Russian military, security and
energy politics and by Lassi Heininen, whose interest lies especially in the environmental and secu-
rity aspects of the Arctic.
The possible models for future governance and the prospects for different interna-
tional forums and the manner of future negotiations over the questions concerning the Arctic have
been contested. Along with the scholarly interest many states have become active; even the Euro-
pean Union has published a paper that could be referred to as an arctic strategy. According to some
scholars37, unlike other arctic states, such as Norway or Canada, Russia does not have a unified
strategy towards its north. Questions of the arctic areas are broad; social, economic, political, mili-
tary and even conceptual. Consequently, Russian policy is dispersed across a variety of different
policy fields, from domestic migration and regional policies to global energy politics. One example
of the complex Russian policy towards the Arctic is that the State Committee on Northern Issues
(Goskomsever), who governed the arctic issues, was disbanded and re-established six times in its
seven years of existence (1992-2000). After the year 2000 the Ministry of Economic Development
and Trade became the most central body in the coordination of the northern policy.38
Even though the policy of Russian Federation towards the Arctic has been elaborated
to be just individual statements rather than a coherent state policy, in this research the Arctic poli-
tics of Russian Federation is lifted to the podium39. Anyhow, the claim that Russia's Arctic policy is
just individual statement was made before the Russian Arctic Strategy came out in 2010. The “indi-
vidual statements”, as well as the strategy papers are constructing the policy of Russia towards the
Arctic and thus representing geopolitical thinking. This paper will contribute to a better understand-
ing of the policy, which has been claimed to be reacted alarmist by western experts and media. Ac-
cording to Kefferputz, “the west has failed to take account the multi-dimensional nature of Russian
policy”.40 Perhaps the discourse studied in this research is not an over-arching, national, discourse,
but a political discourse that can be pointed out, studied and elaborated. Simultaneously the political
and economic interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic are so undeniable that the Arctic re-
gion will remain in the political discourse also in the future.
37 Rove 2009,2.
38 Rove 2009.3.
39 Baev& Trenin 2010.
40 Kefferputz 2010, 7.
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The aim of this study is to scrutinize the different sources and illustrate how Russia
defines and addresses northern spaces, people, opportunities and challenges. What this study adds to
existing knowledge, is that it will concern Arctic as a politically important region and tries to com-
bine the existing knowledge to the critical discourse analysis based on the research data. Evidently
the Arctic in this research is seen as an important factor formulating the country’s geopolitical
thinking and its foreign policy. The combination of the documents produced by the political elite
together with policy papers and secondly the commentators and the officers will help to grasp not
just the official discourse, but the possible alternative discourses of the interest groups. In addition,
the aim is to compare and relate their understanding and conceptions to the geopolitical thinking
formed by previous research. Moreover the theoretical framework, critical geopolitics and Agnew’s
Modern geopolitical thinking, offer tools to analyze the outcome.
2.2 Justification of the Research Task
The Arctic issues, Russian politics towards the Arctic as well as Russian security
strategy have been studied in Russia and elsewhere, as presented earlier. What this research adds to
the previously existing knowledge is that there will be new type of material used besides earlier re-
search outcomes and further the material will be analyzed through critical geopolitical orientation.
The contested nature of Russian geopolitical belongingness will partly determine whether or not the
Arctic region will be maintained as a widely approved area of cooperation and a terrain for peaceful
coexistence. This thesis contributes to a better understanding of the politics and policies in Russia.
Further this thesis is relevant to the extent that the Russian Federation is a remarkable actor in the
Arctic region and with other Arctic states it is defining the future development in the area. Whether
it is cooperation or confrontation, it is crucial to have well-grounded understanding towards Russian
policies and geopolitical thinking. Misunderstanding or failing to interpret actions of Russia and its
raison d’etre in the high north could lead to unjustified policy responses. This could have harmful
consequences and put the peaceful developments in the Arctic at risk.
One of the initial ideas for this paper was the hypothesis that the growing importance
of the Arctic regions in World politics has also affected the Russian geopolitical thinking. The
northern and north-western territories of the Russian Federation have during the last decades
thought to been the most peaceful and stable, while the strategic and geopolitical focus has been in
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the more unstable parts in the southeast regions of the country41. Thus it will be interesting to see,
how the situation is observable in the discourses traced in the research material.
The Second hypothesis relates to the role of the sea in world politics. Many of the as-
pects in the growing global interest towards the Arctic are connected to the sea, such as the new
opening logistic opportunities or access to the new energy resources and to other natural resources.
Further the modernization process in the north and the new investments to the infrastructure proved
this type of interest shift towards the north. How the role of the sea present in the material and what
is can be said about the modernization in reference to the Arctic?
My reasoning implies that there is a need for a rethink on the nature of the Russian
geopolitical thinking.  Further the activities and politics of Russia in the Arctic region and espe-
cially the multi-dimensional nature of the Russian political discourse should be discussed. Russian
geopolitical thinking is not a homogenous concept. It could be argued that it is highly diverse and
varies from actor to another. This thesis aims to contribute to the better understanding of Russian
actors and manoeuvres in the Arctic and northern areas as well as its policies concerning the issue.
Further this research provides an overview of Russian policies and analyzes the discussion over the
high north in several types of sources. The research data will consist of official publications, written
documents, speeches and comments from political leaders, commentators and also from military
officers42.
2.3 Research Questions
The main question for my research is:
What characterizes the Russian geopolitical thinking? How Russian Geopolitical
Thinking constructs the role of the Sea and the Arctic?
Consequently the aim is to see, how is Russian location and belongingness
constructed in the research material in relation to the Arctic? What are the basic factors and
elements in the Russian geopolitical discourses? Furthermore the aim is to see, how modernization
41 Two wars in Chechnya, 5-day war with Georgia and generally the unstable situation in the Caucasus after the Soviet
break-up have drawn Russia’s (geo)political (and strategic) thinking to these areas.
42 More about the research data in Chapter 3.3.
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is presented in reference to the Arctic and the geopolitical thinking of the Russian Federation.
Moreover the goal is to scrutinize more widely, how the growing importance of the Arctic is
perceived and affecting country’s geopolitical thinking?
By answering these questions it is possible to construct and comment on the Arctic
debate in Russia and elsewhere. Moreover the Russian geopolitical thinking on the Arctic might
offer possibilities to comment on wider geopolitical thinking of Russia. Even though the aim is to
study northern areas, they are not separate from the rest of the country and the geopolitical thinking
is not reducible to some parts of the country43.
Since my main aim in research is to characterize the contemporary Russian geopoliti-
cal thinking, especially as it pertains to the role of the sea and modernization in the European north,
the material has to be relatively new. The following chapter will introduce the methodological ori-
entation and the research material used in this thesis.
3. Research Method and the Primary Material
This chapter will introduce the chosen methodology, Critical Discourse Analysis after
Norman Fairclough. But first a few words about the theoretical background, which is post-
structuralism in International Relations. Finally the collected research data and the demarcation
process and the data filter used to narrow down the material will be presented.
3.1. Post-structuralism in IR as a Theoretical Background
Post-structuralism is often described not as a complete theory, but more of a critical
standpoint taken in the research process. It came to International Relations in the 1980’s and is of-
ten not thought to relate to the so-called fourth debate of IR, which was prominent at that time. In-
stead, post-structuralism introduced a new set of questions and concerns to the research or “a meta-
theoretical critique for realist and neo-realist theories”.44 Overall, the questions that post-
structuralism raised were not fitting to the traditional thinking of IR's great debates.
43 More on geopolitical thinking in chapter 4.
44 Campbell, 2007,206-
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Post-structuralism pays attention to the importance of representation and identity in
the “production” and comprehending of international relations. It scrutinizes “who are the ones that
are telling something and especially what they are telling”.45 Post-structuralism further emphasizes
the relation between knowledge and power. One of the characteristics of post-structuralism is to
have the theory as practice instead of separating theory and practice. Thus, post-structuralism is said
to be about mapping the interpretations, and therefore it matches well with the chosen theory of
critical geopolitics, which is also part of so-called critical social theories.46
3.2. Critical Discourse Analysis
Discourses help people to arrange their thoughts and to categorize the world47.
Discourse analysis first came into social science with the so-called linguistic turn. It
was perceived as a cross-disciplinary project to merge the insights from linguistics and hermeneu-
tics with the essentials from social and political science48. Discourse Analysis is not a homogenous
method; more of characteristic to it is a certain criticality and a reformulation of established con-
cepts. In discourse analysis meanings are socially reproduced and rather referred as representations.
In this thesis representations of Arctic are especially under scrutiny; what kind of socially produced
meanings or representations are given to the Russian North? Discourse in this study refers to a spe-
cific series of representations and practices, which are producing meanings, constituting identities,
establishing social relations and making political and ethical outcomes more or less possible49. To
elaborate further, how these representations of the Russian Arctic construct the Russian geopolitical
thinking or what kind of discourses one can locate in this Russian geopolitical thinking? A crucial
role in this paper is to study the written language. Nevertheless, this study is not a linguistic re-
search, but it exploits the method of discourse analysis, which is also used in the study of language.
It can be noted that discourse analysis has been used in many research in the field of
International Relations. Especially it has been applied to the study of conflict and war, peacemaking
and in the feminist field of International Relations. In addition to social science, discourse analysis
has been used for example in linguistics, culture and media studies. To add to this, the study of
45 Campbell, 2007,206.
46 Campbell, 2007,206.
47 Jokinen & Juhila 2002, 66.
48 Torfing 2005,5.
49 Campbell 2007, 216.
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identities, narratives and rhetorics is usually thought to be part of discourse analysis. It has been
said, that the discourse analytic orientation sees research as a comment that will bring forth new
viewpoints to the conversation50. Crucial is to arouse new sights and perspectives, to trigger discus-
sion, not to state something final and definite. In the case of studying Russian politics with the dis-
course analytic orientations it might definitely open up new perspectives, because this methodology
is not very popular among Russian academic research tradition.
It has been stated that the discourse analysis gave a new analytical perspective, which
focused on the rules and meanings that condition the construction of social, political and cultural
identity51. With the help of discourse analysis e.g. research on Russian identity has gained many
new standpoints. Further discourse analysis could be said to widen the analysis of e.g. a single (po-
litical) text or speech to the social, cultural and identity aspects. Nevertheless, the discourse analysis
is not always viewed as a methodology; some see it setting theoretical and metatheoretical assump-
tions and thus working as a comprehensive theoretical research orientation52.
Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) emerged in the late 1980’s and was in-
spired by Michel Foucault’s analysis of the discursive practices, but criticizes his quasi-
transcendental understanding of discourse53. CDA aims to reveal the hidden relations between ob-
jects, such as language, power and ideology. Moreover CDA sees language as the primary domain
of power and ideology. According to one of the founders of CDA, Norman Fairclough, it is as much
of a theory as it is a method. CDA is a theoretical perspective on language and more generally to
semiosis (which includes to the analysis e.g. visuality and gestures). Thus, in this thesis the meth-
odological choice of CDA enables analyzing the Arctic and geopolitical reasoning in the wider con-
text; to construct a geopolitical thinking of Russian Federation, which has the historical, identity
and cultural aspects in the analysis. Fairclough accentuates that the ideological nature of language
should be one of the major themes of modern social science54. Thereby in this thesis the language is
set as the most important object of the research. Taking into account that this is not a linguistic re-
search, some of Fairclough’s aspects, such as the analysis of visuality and gesture (semiosis) are set
aside.
50 Jokinen & Juhila 2002, 66.
51 Torfing 2005,1.
52 E.g. Kroger & Wood 2000, 206.
53 Fairclough 1992, 38-39.
54 Fairclough 2001,2.
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According to Jacob Torfing, post-structuralist discourse analysis has offered a great
amount of sophisticated concepts and arguments that helps us to transcend the objectivistic, reduc-
tionist and rationalistic bias of modern social science. Further it has radicalized hermeneutical alter-
natives by emphasizing the role of discourse and politics in shaping social, political, and cultural
interpretations. Discourse theory has persuaded to notice new aspects in research, such as knowl-
edge paradigms, identity formation and the discursive construction of sentiment norms, values, and
symbols.55 To elaborate further, CDA has often power relations and the (linguistic) structures that
maintain and produce them as a starting point for research56. Accordingly the concepts are often
“loaded” and drawn from post-structuralist origin. As a result CDA sees discourse not just restricted
to spoken or written language, but broaden the concept to the wider set of social practices. As
Chouliaraki & Fairclough enter up:
“It is an important characteristic of the economic, social and cultural changes of late
modernity that they exist as discourses as well as processes that are taking place out-
side discourse, and that the processes that are taking place outside discourse are sub-
stantively shaped by these discourses.”57
CDA rejects the dominant view of language as primarily a referential system and
theorizes language both as practice itself (in its pragmatic or ‘performative’ dimension) and as rep-
resentation of practice (in its semantic dimension).58  Language has this ‘double capacity’, which is
crucial to the process of signification and thus language creates discourses. In the study of Russian
geopolitical thinking in the Arctic one can state that there have been some actual events or claims,
but when studying the representations of these cases, there can be traced discourses behind the indi-
vidual statements. Without a doubt it is the discourses in the geopolitical thinking, which are inter-
esting to analyze and might give new viewpoints to the research. This thesis will concentrate on
written language, even though with the discourse analytics orientation also other types of data, such
as media discourses, pictures published in different types of material, popular films or for example
maps, could easily be used.
55 Torfing, 2005,4-5.
56 Jokinen & Juhila 2002, 56.
57 Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999,4.
58 Chouliaraki 2000,277.
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Evidently, ideologies are closely linked to power and power relations create conven-
tions as means of legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power59. Furthermore
CDA treats the discourse as a social practice and scrutinizes the influences of political, social and
cultural surroundings on discourse. CDA aims to make discourse more visible and transparent,
since it is “an indigestible power object in modern societies”60. According to Fairclough, ideology
often implies distortion or false consciousness, modification of the truth according to one’s inter-
ests. The only way of gaining access to the truth is through representations of it. Thus all represen-
tations include a particular view, certain values as well as goals.61 This study will grasp the ideol-
ogy, the goals and the values presented in the discourses found in the Russian geopolitical thinking.
It has to be noted, that all representations in the discourses are not equal, moreover there can be
made comparison and evaluation on them62. Therefore the aim is to study, what the representations
of the Russian Arctic geopolitics include and exclude, from where the discourses emerge and what
type of factors and interests influence their formulation and projection.
According to Fairclough, one has to scrutinize the three dimensions of a communica-
tive event; the texts, the discursive practices and the socio-cultural practice. Discursive practice re-
fers to processes of text production and consumption whereas socio-cultural practices refer to the
social and cultural going-on which the communicative event is part of.63 So the most interesting as-
pect of any discourse is its context, processes in which the construction of certain discourse is pos-
sible. Thus, the analysis of Russian geopolitical thinking in the Arctic would not be possible with-
out referring also to the wider (geo)political discourse and events in Russia.
3.2.1.  Criticism towards the Discourse Analysis
The critics pointed towards the discourse analytics often reflect on the hermeneutic
approach to text analysis and to the broad context which is used in the analysis. Widdowson has
criticized the term discourse itself: “It is something everybody is talking about without knowing
with any certainty just what it is: It is in vogue and vague”64. Further the goal of making the social
world more transparent is criticized also for possibly making it more simplistic. Even when the dis-
59 Fairclough 2001,2.
60 Fairclough 2001,19.
61 Fairclough 1995,46-47.
62 Fairclough 1995,47.
63 Fairclough, 1995,97.
64 Widdowson, 1995.158
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courses are found, they cannot determine the actions completely. Simultaneously the very large
theoretical framework is sometimes said not to be fitting to the actual research data. The criticism is
indeed based on the idea that discourses and study over representations are too wide in focus, too
generalizing, and carry the attitudes and opinions of the author. Nevertheless, CDA has not even
claimed to be dispassionate or objective research (as objectives social research does), but engaged
in the discussion and committed65. It can be thought as a form of intervention in social practice and
social relationship.
The biggest criticism is, nevertheless, pointed to the political stances taken by re-
searchers66. CDA often openly and explicitly positions the research on the side of the dominated
group and against the ruling party. As an illustration, the typical research interests are often ideo-
logical in character, such as nationalism, racism or gender equality. In discourse analysis the results
that the researcher is producing are not objective, but rather constructed with the help of analytical
tool in the research. As a result, interpretations are always relative and argued on a basis of the au-
thor’s knowledge, but never to be understood as universal facts. To conclude, the standard of care-
ful, throughout and systematic analysis applies with equal emphasis to CDA as to other approaches.
Despite the criticism pointed towards CDA it appears to be the most fruitful method-
ology for this paper, mainly because of four reasons. Firstly, discourses in reference to the Russian
Arctic are not a much studied area. Secondly, the material used in this research differs from earlier
research made on the subject. Thirdly, discourse analysis in general is not widely used in Russian
academia, and might therefore offer new viewpoints and prospects. Finally, the tools from CDA,
such as representations and discourses reveal and help to analyze the ideological factors in the Rus-
sian geopolitical thinking.
3.2.2. Key Concepts of CDA
The most important concept in CDA is discourse, which refers to the fact that there
are several ways of using language, in relevance to the audience, the speaker and the forum. Dis-
course analysis will try to reveal the meaning beyond the linguistic properties, to reveal the ideo-
65 E.g. Van Dijk 2011, 358.
66 More on Criticism e.g. Meyer 2001, Titscher et al., 2000.
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logical nature67. Discourse is referred to as specific series of representations and practices, which
are producing meanings, constituting identities, establishing social relations and making political
and ethical outcomes more or less possible. For example, the discourse of Russian ownership of the
Arctic constitutes to a Russian identity as a northern great power68. Thus, discourse is reduced to a
subset of a broader range of social practices.69 All forms of social practice happen in the context of
a certain discourse (or discourses) which can be broadly defined as relational systems of significa-
tion70. One just cannot state something without the sediment discursive practice, which is constantly
modified and transformed by what we are doing, saying or thinking. Further, there is not just one
system of language, but many, which in the use of language constantly recurs and constructs new
significations.71
By more concrete level discourse is language as social practice, determined by social
structures72. The cooperation discourse in reference to the Arctic, presented in Chapter 5.1., is
stronger in the international arenas, where social structures between states are being exposed. In
these arenas it is important to create mutual understanding and common discourse. Thus, CDA
views language as a socially conditioned process, conditioned also by other, non-linguistic parts of
(international) society73. Social practices include all kinds of linguistically mediated practices; spo-
ken, written as well as images and gestures that social actors exploit in their production and inter-
pretation of meaning. E.g. social classes or different interest groups produce ideological discourses
to maintain their hegemonic power or to establish a new one. Overall, ideological discourse con-
tributes not only to the reproduction of social and political order, but also to its transformation. The
three different discourses, found in this research (presented in Chapter 5), all vary in reference to
the time, place and the actor.
Representations are socially produced meanings, how something is literally re-
presented. For example, the representations of 'the north' in Russian geopolitical thinking might be
interesting to see. Moreover signification, or how subjects and phenomenon are named, is in the
67 Paltridge 2006, 2-3.
68 Presented in chaper 5.2.
69 Torfing 2005,7.
70 Torfing, 2005,14.
71 Jokinen & Juhila 2002.67.
72 Fairclough 2001,14.
73 Fairclough 2001,19.
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central part in the analysis. For example the signification of the Arctic can be scrutinized in the dif-
ferent discourses. In different discourses same events can be named different, as seen through dif-
ferent ‘lenses’. Thus, in this research also signification processes in different types of data can be
explored.
3.2.3. CDA Application
In CDA the status of the data is high, since it is thought to be the actual focus of the
research itself, not a description of the subject74. Consequently according to Fairclough, the analysis
should be on three levels; texts, identities and relations. Further the representations in the texts
should be investigated; how is the world (people, relations) represented? Also the identity formation
should be probed; what identities are set up and why? Altogether the relations between those in-
volved (actors, identities, representations) have to be explored.75 According to Fairclough, a part of
one’s identity is to use language in a certain way76. Hence, it will be interesting to see in this re-
search, does the different actor chosen to my research material talk in a same way. Do they belong
to the same or different discourse(s)?
Neumann further advises three steps in analyzing discourses: delimiting text, mapping
representations and layering discourse.77 Discourses are not separable and their position should be
outlined in relations to others. Neumann writes about showing the intensity and location of a dis-
course:
“The more such things may be specified empirically, the better the analysis. The idea
is to include as many presentations and their variations as possible, and to specify
where they are to be found in as high degree as possible.”78
Different representations in discourses vary on their historical depth and in degree of
dominance/marginalization79. Good analysis also finds the changes in the intensity. In any case it
has to be noted, that the political actors do not usually speak as individuals, the text and speeches
have gone through editing and moreover they are representatives of their countries, governments
74 Suoninen 1993,49-50.
75 Fairclough 1995,5.
76 Fairclough 2001, 123.
77 Neumann 2008, 62.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
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and institutions. Without a doubt also censorship (and selfsensordhip), legal factors or other unre-
vealed factors should be somehow tried to be scrutinized in the analysis. Thus, it is necessary to
take in-depth critical analysis of the contributors and more specifically, of the audience the message
is aimed at. CDA helps revealing to what extend their statements, claims, assertions, and denials are
the product of their own individual agenda and how these are negotiated in contrast to other groups.
According to Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen, statements produce reality. Moreover they
remark that it is not essential, if the actor’s statements are done consciously or not.80 This legiti-
mizes my research as a research of the geopolitical reasoning in the material, in which the actor
might have not initially aimed to comment on the geopolitical thinking itself.
3.3. Demarcation and the Scope of the Study
According to Neumann, one of the starting points for discourse analysis is cultural
competence, in which the researcher needs to recognize the shared understandings in the society.
Nevertheless, there is a flip side with cultural competence; the researcher should not become natu-
ralized or part of the studied object. Neumann refers to this with maintaining marginal gaze.81
In this thesis the geopolitical thinking is constructed through discourses found in the
collected research material. In the formulation of Russian geopolitical thinking, I will look into offi-
cial, political and “naval” aspects in the discourses, so the aim is to have material from different
types of inputs. All the material in this research is from open and public sources. Further the mate-
rial was relatively easy to access, since almost everything was available online. The basic guideline
for data collection was source criticism, namely the pursuit to obtain the information from various
and different types of sources. On the whole this paper studies the political discourse in Russia,
which includes speeches, interviews, reports, analysis and debate by political leaders, officers of the
armed forces, experts and other public figures. Some parts of my research data could also be recog-
nized as a part of media debate, since in contemporary times political actors use media to distribute
their message. Thus, the data has gone through a data filter, to achieve a certain amount of source
criticism and to be able to somehow limit the amount of text scrutinized. In the media for example,
the articles had to be directly referring to the actors which I intend to quote.
80 Jokinen ect. 1993, 42.
81 Neumann 2008, 64.
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Moreover the research was narrowed to north-western Russia and to the Arctic areas
of the European north. My primary data will comprised of several types of material, in which com-
ments are made on (geo)political issues in the Arctic areas or Russia's naval forces.  The research
data has been systematically collected over time, leaving from the Kursk disaster and the publica-
tion of the Russian Maritime Strategy in 2000. The immediate discussion about the Kursk disaster
however, is not qualified as such. The primary material is from three types of sources; firstly the
strategies, doctrines and other official publications by Russian Federation, which are considering
the subject. Secondly the official statements, speeches and commentaries by President Putin and
later President Medvedev will be considered. Thirdly the articles, interviews and comments made
by Russian officers and specialist journalists are explored82. Published in Russia after the year 2000,
this material provides a fair representation of Russian geopolitical discourse. I have used the Inte-
grum database83 to get access to Russian media sources, and the huge amount was then limited by
using the data filter which is introduced in the next page.
Firstly; official policy sources include:
? Maritime Doctrine accepted in 2001 (Morskaya Doktrina),
? Arctic Strategy paper 2008 (henceforth Arctic paper). Foundations of the state politics of the
Russian Federation in the Arctic for 2020 and beyond. (Ru. Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Arktike na period do 2020 goda i dalneishuiu perspektivu) 84,
? National Security Strategy 2009 (Ru. Strategia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi
Federatsii do 2020 goda) and
? Military Doctrine 2010 (Ru. Voennaya Doktrina)
? Strategy of the Arctic Development and National Security 2010 (henceforth Arctic Strategy)
(Ru. Strategia Razvitiya Arkticheskoj zony Rossijskoj Federaczii i Obespecheniya
Naczionalnoj Bezopasnosti na Period do 2020 Goda.)85
82 With this type of add in the primary data I wanted to have other type of input included, outside of policy-makers,
academia and political elite. It turned out that since Russia (earlier Soviet union) has a compulsory military service,
there is no difficulties on finding writings from people who have served in the Armed forces. The retired officers tend to
follow the discussion and comment.
83 Available in universities: (http://www.integrumworld.com/int_profi.html)
84 Strategy was published on the Russian Security Council’ website in the end of March 2009.
85 In English: Strategy for the Development of the Arctic zone of Russian Federation and ensuring the National
Security until 2020. Paper has been published in October 2010 in the Webpage of Russian Ministry for Development
and has been signed by President Medvedev.
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Secondly; speeches by two leaders of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin and
Dmitry Medvedev after the year 2000 to this day will be considered. These speeches have to deal
with the issues of the Arctic or Naval forces. In this category I have 12 speeches. The speeches are
analyzed as written language, since there were not available filmed versions.
Third type of material is drawn from the Russian media and limited with the help of
data filter: text had to be fitting for all of these four benchmarks to be qualified: (Text had to be :)
1. Either about Arctic issues or about Russian naval forces in the high north.
2. Publication after 2000 (the Kursk disaster and discussion as such not fitting for cri-
teria)
3. Published in a Russian media that is nationwide.
4. Writer can be a
a) Journalist, but has to have served or written extensively about the
armed forces of Russian Federation.
b) Officer in Russian or foreign armed forces.
With this data filter the articles are from nine different newspapers in Russia, as well as from some
qualified webpages.
? Barents Observer 1 article
? Itogi (Results) 1
? Kommersant (Businessman) 2
? Kommersant Ogonyok 2
? The Moscow Times 1
? Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper) 3
? Ria Novosti (Russian International News agency) 6
? RBK Daily 1
? Rossijskaya Gazeta (Russian Newspaper) 1
Internet-based sources included Russian Naval portal flot.ru, the Internet pages of the Institute of
Strategic Studies and Analysis, isoa.ru.
Moving on to the next chapter I will move to the actual analyze of my research data, presented
above.
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4. Towards the Russian Geopolitical Thinking
Firstly in this chapter a brief history of geopolitics as a discipline will be introduced. It
is, as later will be elaborated, mainly a ‘western’ discipline, but as a concept used widely in differ-
ent connections. After that, some criticism towards the geopolitics as a field of research will be dis-
closed. Then, the tradition of critical geopolitics will be scrutinized. In the last part the theoretical
tool for my research, the concept of Modern geopolitical thinking by John Agnew, will be intro-
duced. This theory sees geopolitics as a wider mode of thinking, not just a scientific tradition.
4.1. Geopolitical Tradition
Geography or more specifically the body of a state interested early political scientists.
Geopolitics as a concept was first mentioned by a Swedish geographer Rudolf Kjellén in 1899. His
idea was that states have natural geographic body. According to Kjellén, the study of geopolitics
meant studying the territory and the essence of a state. Apparently, Kjellén started the geopolitical
research; nevertheless, this had very little influence on the later schools of geopolitics86.
After Kjellén geopolitics was mainly pursued by geographers and army officers, such
as Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), Alfred Mahan (1840-1914), Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943),
Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) and Karl Haushofer (1869-1946). These scholars are usually thought
to be part of the school of classical geopolitics and mostly referred to as geopolitical tradition. In
Russia, first geopolitical thinkers are said to be N. Danilevsky and L. Mechnikov, who lived in the
19th century. During the Second World War and afterwards geopolitics inherited accusations of
Nazi connections and thus came marginalized. Nevertheless, much of the research orientation
stayed in particularly in military academies, usually studied in the field of strategic studies. Thereaf-
ter, in the 1970’s geopolitics became more popular because of the great power politics of the Cold
War. This western tradition of geopolitics became later on re-examined by political geographists
and international relations scholars with the help of critical geopolitical theorizing.
Naturalization of binary division ‘us’ versus ‘others’ reached its zenith in the geopo-
litical schemas proposed in the late 19th century and early 20th century. Particularly, these borders
have been drawn in Europe to divide the other from us, for example Edward Said in his Oriental-
86 Moisio 2001, 15.
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ism87. In geographical literature the divide has been historically between land and sea powers, like
in American General Alfred Mahan’s argumentation88. To demonstrate the Post-Cold War global-
ized world Samuel Huntington created his theory of civilizations which were based on cultures89.
Moreover in the late 19th century to the discussion came the opposition between land and sea pow-
ers, first noted by the ancient Greek writer Thucydides in his Peloponnesian War. In this reasoning,
the geographical location suggested the ‘fate’ of the nation. Russia in relation to this tradition is
usually thought to be the perfect example of 'geopolitical land power'.
 During the Soviet times geopolitics was not that widely practised and actually it was
conceived as pseudo-science and associated with fascism. Geopolitics was unnecessary in the So-
viet society, because homo soveticus could survive everywhere despite the conditions and surround-
ings90. However, even thought the discipline of geopolitics was not exercised and the word ‘geopo-
litical’ mentioned, it survived as an interdisciplinary practise and revived soon in 1990’s after the
Soviet Union collapsed.
Russian geopolitical thinking has its origins in westernism versus eurasianism (or his-
torically westernism and slavophilism) -debate. Further the discourse of imperialism or”great
powerness” (derzhavnost) has been in the core. Russian geopolitical tradition relies especially on
the work of British geographer Halford Mackinder and his theory about the geographical pivot of
the world, which according to Mackinder was the Eurasian continent. In his theory, Eastern Europe
gained much emphasis.91 From the two historical schools, Eurasianism emphasizes geopolitical and
cultural uniqueness of Russia. Westernism, on the contrary, saw Russia as part of the western tradi-
tion and culturally close to Europe. Eurasianism as well as Westernism has not been just an intellec-
tual, but also a political movement. Especially eurasianism from the 1930’s onwards emphasized
Russia’s geopolitical and cultural independency, or ‘self-standing’ (samostoianiye).  The founders
of the ‘Eurasian School’ were the Trubetskoi brothers at the beginning of the 20th century. Con-
temporary leader and main theorist of this orientation is A. Dugin. Despite the strong Eurasian
school, there are also a number of independent geopolitical scholars in Russia, namely I. Busygina,
K.Gadzhiev, M. Iluin, R.Turovsky and D. Zamyatin.
87 Said 1978.
88 See Mahan 1890.
89 Huntington 1993,22-25.
90 More on Hauner 1989, 217.
91 See Mackinder 1904.
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4.2. Criticism towards the (Classical) Geopolitics
The most prominent critique towards geopolitical tradition is its naturalistic attitude.
The classical geopolitical school saw very little space to analyze; moreover the classical geopolitics
is based on the idea of a natural gaze, or eye as a witness, not an interpreter.92 Classical geopolitics
is closely linked to the political realism, where the interpretation is based on power-politics and
states prioritizing their interest over ideology or moral concerns.
Moreover classical geopolitics was accused of being racist with its euro-centrism and
seeing Western civilization (or white race) as naturally superior. Also the accusations of imperial-
ism or geographical determinism were observed. Critical geopolitics leaved behind the aspects that
geopolitics has been criticised for; it has its base on post-structuralist reasoning and discourses, to
elaborate further it has abandoned the state-centric understanding of power as in classical geopoli-
tics. In critical geopolitics, the power is probed through investigating the discourses. These dis-
courses are in this study presented in the following fifth chapter. However, first we will look at the
critical geopolitics more closely, followed by introducing the theory of Modern Geopolitical Think-
ing by John Agnew.
4.3. Critical Geopolitics
In complex post-modern times…geopolitical visions and visionaries seem to thrive.
Gearoid Ò Tuathail93
As mentioned above, the theoretical choice for this research will be critical geopoli-
tics, which has been separated from both classical and so-called new geopolitics. Critical geopoli-
tics views the geographical space as a product of political and cultural imagination, rather than
something ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’. The Arctic is not a neutral region in this study; rather it follows
these considerations raised by Critical geopolitics, in which political thinking is tied with represen-
tations of geographical space. For example politicians might argue, what they see appropriate in a
given situation, with the audience at the situation and what they see suitable for their own purposes.
92 More on O’Tuathail 1996,23.
93 O’Tuathail 1998, 2.
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As Sami Moisio points out, common feature for scholars who use critical geopolitics is that geopo-
litical phenomenon are socially and politically constructed94.
Critical geopolitics tends to contest big geopolitical theories of the 1900’s and draw
attention to the multiplicity of the postmodern society. Further the aim in critical geopolitics has
been drawing attention to the fact that geographical knowledge is one type of power, which
O’Tuathail refers to as geo-power95. Simon Dalby has articulated: “a world that is structured
through geopolitics is never equal”96. Critical geopolitics has also wanted to go apart from so-called
geostrategy, which is mainly in the military science used as a realistic “new wave” of using terms
from classical geopolitics. Thus, this paper tries to reveal the power construction in reference to
Russia’s Arctic and further, how this power is presented in the discourses of Russian geopolitical
thinking.
Critical geopolitics is thought to originate from Gearóid Ó Tuathail's book Critical
Geopolitics, published in 1996. In this book he develops his 'critical theory of geopolitics’. With the
prefix ‘critical’ scholars wanted to attach geopolitics to a wider tradition of critical research. Fur-
thermore critical geopolitics examines how the world has been portrayed in political activities, how
reality has been mapped and mastered. Critical geopolitics emphasizes the socially constructed na-
ture of geographical space and draws out attention to possibilities of re-evaluation of political order
beyond the understanding of the Westphalian world. Further according to O'Tuathail and Dalby97,
critical geopolitics has several key arguments; firstly, they emphasize the need to go beyond the
state practises and move towards delineating the particular cultural myths underlying these prac-
tises, such as the myth of national uniqueness. Secondly, in critical geopolitics the boundaries are
considered in a broader sense than just by power and domination. The critical geopolitics is “con-
cerned as much with maps of meaning as it is with maps of states. The boundary-drawing prac-
tises... are conceptual and cartographic, imaginary and actual, social and aesthetic.98” The borders
and boundaries in reference to the Russian geopolitical thinking will be considered in the discussion
chapter.
94 Moisio 2003,27.
95 O’Tuathail 1996.
96 See e.g. Dalby 1994 for more about gender-geopolitics.
97 O’Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 1-8.
98 Ibid,4.
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According to John Agnew, geo-politics or study of geopolitics is “study of the geopo-
litical representations and practises that underpin world politics or the examination of geographical
assumptions, designations and understandings that enter into the making of world politics.99” Fur-
ther about the geopolitical thinking Agnew has written, that military, or more specifically a strategic
dimension to contemporary geopolitical thinking is continuously a matter of attention; however, the
empire is not only about military force, neither the contemporary hegemony is a matter of military
force or territorial conquest100. Nevertheless, many wars and conflicts even today are justified in
language explicitly geographical terms101.
The geopolitical thinking affects the nature of politicians’ and other political actors’
geopolitical argumentation. Further it can be defined as “interpretative culture and traditions within
which a state makes sense of its identity and encounter with the world of states, and codifies a set of
strategies for negotiating that encounter102” Thus, changes in geopolitical culture reflect also the
changes in the primary functions of a state or further, the military forces. According to Simon
Dalby103, earlier the main tasks for the armed forces were patrolling the peripheries against external
threats and secondly internal pacification, administration and policing. The latter has grown in im-
portance after the end of the Cold War when the focus was much more on the spatial struggles for
power and influence between great powers. The geopolitical thinking is further important in the
construction of threats; how these threats are mapped, specifying important places and marginal
places, and in turn the justifications for certain kinds of military forces best fitting for dealing with
dangers in these specific places. Moreover, even when the threat perception might have changed,
the language used is still based on territorial strategies, consequently the language changed from
great power rivalry to geo-economic rivalries104.
The most known critical geopolitical scholars are John O'Loughlin, Gearóid Ó
Tuathail and Vladimir Kolossov, as well as John Agnew and Simon Dalby. In Finland critical geo-
politics is researched by Professor Pami Aalto, who has studied post geopolitics of the European
north. Russia also works of D. Zamyatin are close to the critical geopolitics. Critical geopolitics and
Arctic has also recently been studied by Klaus Dodds, Richard Powell and Jason Dittmer. Moreover
99 Agnew 1998,2.
100 Agnew 2005.
101 Dalby 2008, 415.
102 O’Loughlin et al. 2004, 5.
103 Ibid.
104 Agnew & Corbridge 1989.
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in Finland the Arctic has been studied recently by Sami Moisio, Timo Koivurova and Lassi Hein-
inen.
Also Russian geopolitical thinking has been studied before. For example Smith and
Timmins have studied Russian’s relations to NATO and the EU. Further so called geopolitical
storylines have been studies by O’Loughlin, O’Tuathail and Kolossov. They studied after the Sep-
tember 11th attacks the geopolitical storylines of the Russian political elite, public opinion and be-
tween those two.105 Also Sirke Mäkinen used geopolitical storyline in her doctoral thesis about the
Russian political parties’ geopolitical argumentation.
4.4. Agnew’s Modern Geopolitical Imagination
John Agnew wrote about his concept of modern geographical Imagination in his book
“Geopolitics, re-visioning world politics” which was published in 1998. With re-visioning the
world politics he meant that the end of the Cold War and the declining military viability of even the
largest states, growing global markets, expanding transnational capitalism and the modes of govern-
ance alternative to that of the territorial state (EU, IMF, UN, WB) have begun to undermine the
possibility of seeing power as solely a spatial monopoly exercised by states. Further Agnew has
noted that despite the changing meaning of military capacity, many contemporary conflicts even
today are justified in language explicitly by geographical terms106. Agnew argues, that even thought
the geopolitics as a discipline is fairly young, long before it was born as an academic discipline
there was a certain geopolitical thinking. John Agnew calls this Modern geopolitical imagination.
This thinking came into being when Europeans first encountered the rest of the world. Conse-
quently the onset of the capitalist world economy and the growth of the European territorial state
started parcelling out areas.107 According to Agnew Modern geopolitical imagination was given
birth to by the capitalist world economy and the growth of the European territorial state108.
This idea introduced by Agnew will be also guide line for the next chapter, which con-
tains analyze of the research data. Even if this theory emphasizes geopolitical factors, it does not
mean that other type of factors is lower in value. The world is and has been throughout the history
105 O’Loughlin et al 2004..
106 Dalby 2008, 415.
107 Agnew 1998,3.
108 Agnew 1998,3.
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actively ‘spatialized’, ‘divided up’, ‘labelled’, ‘sorted out’ into a hierarchy of places of greater or
lesser importance by political actors and scholars109.
Agnew saw break-up of the Soviet Union, the NATO and the EU expansions as well
as regional separatist movements in different regions easy to scrutinize with the geopolitical
imagination. More lately questions of the organization of power combined with those of
geographical definition raised by the global warming and the retreat of the arctic ice caps.  Thus
also the changing political situation in the high north can easily be studied with geopolitical theory.
Consequently, the concept of modern geopolitical imagination is a historicist one and offers tools
but does not provide ready answers. The modern geopolitical imagination does not presume a set of
fixed beliefs, knowledge, attitudes, and practices that remain essentially unchanged throughout the
history110.
In Modern Geopolitical Thinking the different areas of the world are organized
hierarchically according to religious, ‘racial’, climatory or civilizational factors. The divisions or
boundaries are drawn between the self and the other or more precisely between known and
unknown or friendly and hostile places. Further modern geopolitical imagination has four
fundamentals, which preceded the later ones. First fundamental was born during the Age of
Discoveries, a global vision. Before this the unknown was pictured as a source of chaos and danger,
but the global vision allowed seeing the world-as-a-whole and thus provided for a concept of world
politics.111 This objective and natural view is according to Agnew, a view from nowhere. The most
well-known representations of the dichotomy of known and unknown are that of a dichotomous east
and west. Edward Said wrote, that “Europeans define themselves negatively, against others whose
nature is largely unknown112”.
The second fundamental in Agnew’s Modern Geopolitical Thinking is “translation of
time into space”, which means that different regions of the world seem to present a certain period of
time. Further it means that the regions are in different phases of ‘historical development’. Places
could have been named “developed”, “primitive”, “modern” or “backward”. This type of thinking
enabled the idea of superiority of some places over others. According to this fundamental also
109 Agnew 1998, 2.
110 Agnew 2003,128.
111 Ibid. 8.
112 Said 1978.
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Europe was often represented as most developed and thus, superior. According to Agnew, even after
the colonialism has decreased, the western imperialism continues through the discursive
practises.113
The third fundamental is state-centric understanding of spatiality of power. Thus, the
world is made of territorial actors or states opposed other forms of policy. Agnew names this feature
as a territorial trap.114 The state defines its borders, which are also borders of society and internal
and external affairs are seen as completely separately. Yet the concept of territorial trap is not
always applicable in the modern world, the drawbacks are becoming obvious. On the one hand,
territorial trap owes much to the perceived changes in the relations between states and to the
emergence of a global society in which states must share power with other types of actors. After the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War even the largest states, growing global
markets, expanding transnational capitalism and modes of the governance alternative to that of the
territorial states (e.g. EU, IMF, and WB) have begun to undermine the possibility of seeing power
as solely a spatial monopoly exercised by states.115 In this research, nevertheless, the state is in the
centre. The state policy towards the Arctic will be scrutinised.
The fourth fundamental is the idea that pursuit for states interest or security is relative
to those of all others. Power is thus thought to be proportional.116 Modern geopolitical imagination
frames world politics in term of global context in which states view power outside their boundaries,
gain control (formally and informally) over less modern regions. There is a rivalry among states to
avoid overthrown. Behind this is state’s necessary for ontological security117. In Agnew’s Modern
geopolitical thinking only the rivalry guarantees the well-being of a society. This pursuit provides
the geographical framing within political elites and mass publics in the world in pursuit of their own
identities and interests118.
To conclude, the modern geopolitical imagination, like the construction of global
space, was never set for all time119. The building blocks or principles have remained more or less
113 Agnew 1998, 45.
114 Agnew 1998, 9,49-50.
115 Agnew 1998,50.
116 Agnew 1998, 68-70.
117 Agnew 1998,9.
118 Agnew, 1998,2.
119 Agnew 1998,122.
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the same, but the end product is somewhat different. Historically these fundamentals did not
suddenly spring forth during the birth of territorial states, but there are long-standing historical roots
that still influence on the geopolitical thinking of states. Hence, the modern geopolitical thinking
can and should be adjusted to the technological and economic changes of the contemporary world.
4.5. Critical Geopolitical Concepts
Russian geopolitical thinking in my research will assume that spatial imagination is a
crucial part in shaping future political and cultural boundaries of Russia. Moreover the geopolitical
thinking in this research refers to the idea that geographical belongingness is gaining more emphasis
in the age of globalization and global energy market; geographical entities have their position in the
political discourse, even though the meaning of geography to a country might be different than in
history. In the geopolitical thinking the geographical space will be viewed as a product of political
and cultural imagination, rather than as something ‘natural’ or ‘objective.120 To elaborate further,
geopolitical thinking is not unchangeable; it is built in its context. The presumption is, that geopo-
litical thinking is embodied in the Russian policy towards the Arctic, further it legitimizes the dis-
courses. According to Agnew, in modern geopolitical thinking it is common to describe an area
with a single feature, to essentialize. Moreover the comparison between two regions is often made
with only one criterion and thus the aim is to exotize. Third common feature is to change the quan-
tity of some perceived difference, that is, to totalize.121
5. Discourses of the Russian Geopolitical Thinking
This chapter will analyze the three discourses traced in the research data (introduced
in Chapter 3.3). The first discourse based on the representations of cooperation in the Arctic
(Chapter 5,1), the second discourse represented the sovereign rights of the Russian Federation
(Chapter 5,2) and the third included the concept of modernization (Chapter 5,3).
To locate the discourses CDA offered applicable tools; the emphasis was drawn on
how the different concepts or geographical issues were presented, what type of meanings or in
CDA, representations they gain. The basic question was “how the Arctic is re-presented in the
material?” Since in this paper non-linguistic parts of the language (like gestures, body language,
120 More on Chapter 2.1 Towards Critical Geopolitics
121 Agnew 1998,33.
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popular literature films and pictures) were not noted, the emphasis was on the written text and the
layout. The territorial claims, expeditions and other political acts were also noted.
Another concept offered by CDA, signification, was also helpful; it denotes the
naming of a phenomenon or a subject. For example the research conducted in the Arctic sea in 2007
gained various different significations; moreover the Arctic strategy released in 2010 was for the
development of the Arctic region – not for the example stabilizing or modernization of this area.
According to CDA, an ideological discourse contributes “not only to the reproduction of social and
political order, but also to its transformation”122. Thus, these discourses do not only maintain the
status quo, but construct new types of possible meanings to the Arctic, and thus produce possible
transformations in the geopolitical thinking. Further there were differences in the depth and
intensity of different discourses.
The analysis based also on Agnew’s modern geopolitical thinking123 and  the
geopolitical aspects on the material. According to Agnew, contemporary geopolitical thinking is
continuously a matter of attention; however the empire is not only about military force, neither the
contemporary hegemony is matter of military force or territorial conquest124. Thus, the geopolitical
aspects are traced in the discourses and are ideational in nature.
The logic of the following chapter is that after introducing each of the discourses and
the representations in them, following this the discourse will be parcelled to some representations
and scrutinized mainly in chronological order.
5.1. Discourse on Cooperation
It’s difficult to survive in the Arctic when you are alone; it is well-known time-tested fact. Arctic
nature itself makes individuals, groups of people and entire countries dependent on each other.”
Prime Minister Putin in the International Arctic Forum in 2010125
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the cooperation in the North became
vivid, it evolved specially in the fields of environmental, social and military cooperation. (See pages
122 More on CDA in Chapter 3.
123 See chapter 4.
124 Agnew 2005.
125 Putin 2010.
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4-7.) Typical cooperation involved different types of nuclear safety and social development cross-
border projects with Nordic and Russian partners. Moreover collaboration on environment-related
issues was common and in the military field cooperation became more accurate when borders
became more open and the rivalry of the Cold War ended. The new types of cross-border projects
created new arenas for communication and enhanced atmosphere of trust between the actors
involved. Consequently this type of cooperation led to the creation of many new international
organizations and actors in the 1990’s, such as the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region
and the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Simultaneously the Northern Dimension was introduced in
the 1990’s. During the 1990's Russia’s participation was sporadic in the financially challenging
times of 1990’s, but it has more recently become relatively active participant. All these different
forums and spheres of cooperation depict the importance of the cooperation in the north. Overall,
the cooperation discourse has been strong in the Russian north; because of the stable border areas
that Russia shared with Nordic countries and because of special interest pointed by Nordic countries
to Russia.
At times Russia’s participation in the cross-border projects was more indolent126, but
the importance pointed to cooperation in the state-level has been found in the national strategies that
have referred to the Arctic issues. Towards the end of the research period this discourse has grown
stronger. It has made its way to the public speeches by President Medvedev and Prime Minster
Putin.
5.1.1. Cooperative Forums and Projects
The ambivalent representation of cooperation in the north was noticeable especially in
the beginning of the research period. In the Maritime Doctrine (2001) ‘cooperation’ gained different
types of representations; the doctrine views cooperation as important, but at the same time as a
threat. Cooperation might contribute to the “inevitable competition, (which is) on the way”127. The
paper refers to possibility of cooperation, but then again clearly emphasizes the sovereign rights of
the country128.
126 Russian representatives not from the high-level and cooperation not mentioned in the domestic political arena.
127 More about assertive politics in the Chapter 5,2.
128 More about Russia’s sovereign rights discourse on next subchapter.
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“The essence of the national policies of the major maritime powers and the majority of
the world community in the foreseeable future will be an independent action and co-
operation in the development of the oceans.129”
The Maritime Doctrine was partly a disappointment when being scrutinized; it con-
tained very little concrete measures or decisions for the naval forces or for the Arctic areas. The fact
that the paper presented an extensive list of different maritime activities made it very wide in focus.
Thus, the Maritime Doctrine was supposed to cover everything from fishering to security politics in
reference to the sea as well as to inland waters.
Further the Arctic gained representation in the Maritime Doctrine as an area with eco-
nomic potential through the cooperation. The bottom line was to depict how the oceans could be
exploited and how Russia’s own interests in economic sense could be guaranteed. The economic
interest as such links together with the cooperative discourse, since in the northern areas mutual
projects are needed to gain the best possible financial outcomes. Further according to the coopera-
tive discourse, non-military means are being underlined as the important ones for solving the possi-
ble conflicts and determine the future of the northern areas. As the Maritime Doctrine states, there is
“A principle of political-diplomatic, economic, information and other non-military
means in resolving conflicts in the oceans and the removal of threats to natural security
of the Russian Federation with the maritime areas130”
5.1.2. Cooperation in a Unique Setting
Recently many countries with an interest in the Arctic region have published their
Arctic Strategies. The Russian Arctic Paper131 was released in 2008 and called the Foundations of
Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and beyond. The paper represents the
Arctic as a unique area, with many possibilities for cooperation. According to the Arctic Paper, the
region has specific type of nature and should be maintained as a zone of peace and cooperation.
Russian Arctic Paper also names sustainable development and environmental conservation as im-
portant areas for cooperation. Interestingly, one of the goals in this strategy is to create a more posi-
tive image of Russia. Further the strategy envisions increased cooperation with neighbouring coun-
129 MD (The Maritime Doctrine) 2001,1.
130 MD 2001,3.
131 Not a strategy paper, as the one published in late 2010.
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tries in the fight against terrorism, drug-trafficking, illegal immigration and environmental protec-
tion.132
The fact that the Russian Arctic Paper133 was released in 2008 marked the re-
emergence of the north as a separate policy field. Before this point the trend was to have northern
policies along with other policy field and the measures were taken just to answer ad hoc situations
and problems, concerning for example social and economic crises in the north. The Arctic strategies
have appointed out several perceptions towards the Arctic areas and how it should be treated. Fur-
ther in the Arctic strategies countries propose their solutions for the future governance or ownership
of this space. The Russian version of Arctic policy paper itself reminds a lot of similar papers by
other Arctic states. The more thorough strategy was then released in 2010. The 2008 paper repre-
sented and emphasized soft security issues, such as human security and environmental factors. Fur-
ther this paper maintained the cooperative discourse in the Russian Arctic policy, since the repre-
sentation was the common interests of all Arctic states.
The cooperative discourse in reference to the Arctic also relates to the discourse over
the Antarctica, which is the area that could naturally be compared to the high north. The unsolved
situation in the Antarctica was solved with the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 and has since then guaran-
teed in the continent peaceful co-existence, cooperation and non-militarisation. Antarctica is even
nowadays dedicated to science and research.
Temporally, the cooperation discourse was the most intense in 2010, when Prime
Minister Putin talked in the international forum called “Arctic –territory of dialogue”. The name of
the seminar itself underlines the cooperation discourse in reference to high north. Further the
audience was international, mainly researchers, officials and some of the political elite of Arctic
countries’. The message of Prime Minister Putin was basically praising the coexistence and the
prospects for cooperation in the north. Before the conference Putin had concluded that the forum
“will discuss the existing disputes in calm and neighbourly manner... will listen to each other rather
than exchange threats on non-existing issues.”134 Further Putin had a speech about the highly
motivated environmental protection in the high north, as well as strengthened the cooperation
discourse by introducing the concept of common arctic home:
132 The Russian Arctic Paper 2008.
133 Literally: Foundations of the state politics of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for 2020 and beyond.
134 RIA 2010.
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“While we are taking care of a steady and balanced development of the Russian north,
we are working to strengthen our ties with our neighbours in our common arctic
home. And we think that preserving the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation is
of the utmost importance. It is our conviction that the Arctic area should serve as a
platform for uniting forces for genuine partnership in the economy, security, science,
education and the preservation of the north’s cultural heritage.”135
Further in the same forum Putin saw, that there is a need for consensus on several is-
sues concerning the Arctic and thus the countries that have substantial experience in the Arctic have
a special responsibility. Putin represented the Arctic and its natural resources subject to competing
and growing “geo-political interest”, but at the same time emphasized UN’s role and said that all
claims should be done according to international law. Just after the claims on continental shelf and
the explorations in 2007-2008, Putin’s appearance in the Arctic forum was surprisingly conflict-
averse. Further it emphasized not just cooperation, but need for consensus, mutual interests and the
interdependence that the harsh arctic conditions create to all the inhabitants of the north136.
One of the most trust-building actions in the cooperative discourse was in 2010, when
Russia and Norway signed a treaty that ended the 40-year old dispute over areas in the Barents Sea.
Indeed, when signing the treaty, President Medvedev said that “In the Arctic, it is possible to move
on without NATO.”137 Therefore the cooperation discourse in the north for Russia – is applicable as
long as it does not mean another military block like NATO. Most directly NATO's role in Russian
geopolitical thinking was put out in the 2010 Military Doctrine, which aligned; “main external
threats of war comes from NATO's expansion east to Russia's borders138” Interestingly, in the Mili-
tary Doctrine one can find no reference to the Arctic. The region was not listed as a possible source
for a conflict or as a direction of importance in military sphere. Thus, when it comes to the northern
areas, cooperation is more desirable than confrontation, even in the documents that survey the pos-
sible threats for the Russian Federation.
5.1.3. Economic Motivators
Russian Arctic Strategy (2010) offered some 170 pages of detailed, regional and sec-
toral development plans for the ‘Arctic zone’ of the Russian Federation. The development plans of
the Paper included chapter of the representation of the economic importance of the Arctic zone. Ac-
135 Putin 2010.
136 See the quote in the beginning of this sub chapter.
137 Ogonyok 2010b.
138 Military Doctrine 2010.
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cording to the strategy, arctic economy should be changed from current post-Soviet economy to a
modern, innovation-based economy. This is achievable through the many “megaprojects” and inno-
vations that are being planned to the arctic region. Further the paper emphasized the role of coop-
eration in various fields due to the strategic partnership with other arctic states. Ultimately the
chapter that covered the theme of national security of Russia Federation in the Arctic was available
only to Russian officials. The following sentence highlights the multiple viewpoints that this strat-
egy paper takes into account when addressing the situation and the motivations for the developmen-
tal goals in the Russian arctic:
“The solutions for challenges in the Arctic zone that take into consideration the pecu-
liarities of the region will lead to increasing competitiveness in the north and in the
rest of the country. Further goods and services produced in the Arctic zone serve not
just regional, but also sub-regional and global markets, and enhance the quality of life
and the welfare of the population in the region. The policy helps in production of a
significant socio-economic change and leads the Arctic areas to the path of a sustain-
able growth, to the preservation of traditions (...) Moreover the policy ensures defence
and security in all spheres of life and strengthens the strategic partnerships with other
Arctic states. It also intensifies international cooperation with countries that study de-
velopment and exploitation of the Arctic areas and resources, ensuring the optimal po-
sition for Russia in the macro-regional division of labour and furthermore in maintain-
ing the political stability and in strengthening the international authority of the Rus-
sian Federation.139”
The development paper sees places for development in its social and environmental
scenes but also in economic situation. The cooperation is brought in the field of resource extraction,
which relates to the fact that for fully exploitation of the Arctic resources Russia still needs some
development and know-how. Overall, the cooperative discourse is very tightly linked to the energy
extraction in the far north. Under the Russian law only Gazprom and Rosneft can carry out produc-
tion activity on the county’s continental shelf, but they have shown very little interest in exploring
the Eastern Siberian and Chukotka seas140. The president of Rosneft has shown and estimated costs
that have given the officials an honest idea of the tremendous price tag that exploring the far north
would cost141. Because the resources are not easily accessible, there has to be more cooperation in
the future. At the moment it seems that the Russian actors are not taking the risks by themselves,
moreover the majority of the know-how has to be imported. The money was not a problem for the
139 Arctic Strategy 2010, 6-7.
140 Situation with hand-picked oil companies might change in the future.
141 Kommersant 2008.
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Russian companies and investment plans in the late 90’s, but during the financial crisis of the recent
years even the state companies rescheduled or cancelled the exploration activities. However, the
political debates over the Arctic energy resources continue. If I had taken more material under ex-
amination on the economic aspects, such as the Gazprom and Rosneft strategies and releases, the
representation of the economic interest of the cooperation discourse would have been even stronger.
 In any case, Russia has clearly recognised that technological and financial help is
needed to get the Arctic energy projects running. There are several possible substitutes for the Sibe-
rian fields in the Arctic, such as the fields on the Yamal Peninsula and offshore fields like the
Shtokman field in the Barents Sea. Most of these potential fields are located far from existing infra-
structure and are in environments where it is more difficult to operate than in the western Siberian
fields. Consequently, the production costs are likely to be even higher in the future, which increases
the need for investment and decreases the will to start exploiting. Foreign know-how and finance
are required for the development of the Russian gas industry. In August 2011 some hints about the
growing activities in the north were published; Rosneft and American ExxonMobil signed a con-
tract on the exploration of the Arctic energy resources. They are developing one of the world’s larg-
est gas fields, Shtokman, 600 kilometres northeast of the city of Murmansk.142 Gazprom is also
planning corresponding projects in the Yamal peninsula.143
It seems that the Russia Arctic Strategy emphasizes every other aspect of the Arctic
zone, except the ownership over the natural resources.  The paper further reiterates the strategic im-
portance by stating that:
“The arctic zone serves as a strategic resource base for the Russian Federation and
provides the solution of socio-economic development challenges of the country. The
arctic zone produces more than 80% of Russian gas and is a very important region for
the mining industry. 144”
The current situation that energy prices are staying relatively high, might affect the
ability and will for Russian actors to carry out the development goals set in the strategy. As it ad-
mits, the energy revenues coming from the Arctic areas have provided so far the solution for coun-
try’s socio-economic problems.
142 RIA 2011b.
143 Kommersant 2010a..
144 Arctic Development Paper 2010,9.
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To conclude, Russian geopolitical thinking includes a cooperative discourse in refer-
ence to the Arctic. This discourse constructs the Arctic as a potential source for cooperative actions,
mainly concerning the economical and ecological spheres of the state policies. Accordingly this dis-
course depicts Russia as a main actor in the Arctic region, whose interest is to have functioning re-
lations with other actors that tackle same type of challenges. Definitely the cooperation is mainly
needed to secure the viability of the area and the effective utilization of the potential sources of
economic gains. Main terms to characterize the cooperative discourse are such as interdependence,
mutual interest and consensus, but also since the economic interest; exploitation and utilization.
The international forums on the Arctic issues on their part maintain the cooperative discourse and
strengthen it through the common projects and vivid interaction in the low-level cooperation and in
political arenas. These cooperative forums remain high in interests even after 20 years since the So-
viet break-up. Anyhow, Russia has not adopted a role of an active agenda setter in these forums;
instead it is a participant and follows the discussions. Russian representatives to these international
forums have abstemiously seem to be avoiding the issues that may seem to be of greater (strategic)
importance, such as security, foreign policy, economic issues145. Russian geographic society146 has
even started its own new international forum in Russia, first one with title of “Arctic - territory for
dialogue” gained much publicity in Russia, mainly in its ecological openings. Interestingly, there
are also signs that environmental problems are recently being reclassified as strategic and thus less
open. It can refer to the fact that e.g. the large nuclear waste problem in the Arctic sea is from mili-
tary-specified origin and situated close to military bases in the north. This might lead to an evident
drawback for Arctic cooperation, since environmental field maintained much of this cooperation
after the first enthusiasm of 1990’s dissipated. Russia’s interest to negotiate in multilateral forums
in general has not too often involved politically problematic issues147. Thus, it will be interesting to
see in which forum and in what manner the future questions of Arctic space will be discussed.
5.2. Discourse on Sovereign Rights of the Russian Federation
Historically the question of Russia’s ‘ownership’ over the Arctic was irrelevant – dur-
ing the Soviet period the north was a closed, nationalized space. A huge sector covering almost one-
third of the Arctic Ocean was designated to Soviet Union as its territorial waters. Also the indige-
145 Rowe 2009, 6.
146 The Chairman of the Board of Trustees is Prime Minister Putin.
147 E.g. Rowe 2009.
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nous people of the north and northern resources played an important part in the planned economy,
According to Baev148, the emphasis during the Soviet times in the north positioned the Arctic as a
firm factor both in the national identity and conceptions of security and sovereignty. Simultaneously
it resulted in Russia inheriting from the Soviet Union an overpopulated north, not very adoptable to
the ideas of market economy. The discourse of Russia’s sovereign rights in the Arctic areas became
vivid after the geopolitical situation changed rapidly after the end of the Cold War. But the historic
motivation is not the only representation – the discourse of sovereign rights of the Russian Federa-
tion is more nuanced that it at first might seem.
5.2.1. Geographic Belongingness
Russia’s sovereign rights discourse relates to the country's ability to work in the Arctic
conditions. In April 2000, only an o month after President Putin entered the office, he went on a nu-
clear submarine called ‘Russia’ for a meeting on the future prospects of the development of the
northern seas. Already then Putin indicated the need for urgent rebuilding of country’s ice-breaking
capacity to provide Russia’s return to the Arctic waters. A couple of months later in August, arctic
areas gained more attention, when a nuclear-powered submarine Kursk sank. The first and probably
the last image mistake for Putin were, when during the tragic events in the Kursk he was having va-
cation in Sochi. Later Putin promised to reinvigorate the Navy and increase the military spending.149
As early as in 2001, a year after the Kursk disaster President Putin made clear in his
speech in Severodvinsk that the Navy of today’s Russia is not just to secure the borders of the coun-
try, but also to ensure the preservation of natural resources. “Thanks to the fleet, we can use the vast
natural resources, which are located in the seabed.”150
Partly due to the tragic events in Kursk Russia published the Maritime doctrine in
2001. The doctrine aligned so-called maritime activities, which were in the field of research, devel-
opment and the further use of the oceans. These maritime activities were put out in the interest of
Russia’s security, sustainable economic and social development151. In this way the usage of the
phrase use (or exploit) oceans also refers to sovereign rights over the high north. In the beginning of
the Doctrine is written, that the essence of the Russian national maritime policy is to achieve Rus-
148 2009,3.
149 BBC 2000.
150 Putin 2001.
151 MD 2001,1.
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sia’s national interest, not just in its territorial waters and inland marine waters, but also in its con-
tinental shelf and on the high seas152. The last two are the ones that have been under a debate and
still remain unsolved. The doctrine further introduces the national interest of the Russian Federation
in the Oceans, which are
? Inviolability of the sovereignty of the country in maritime waters as well as in the airspace
above them, on the floor and subsoil;
? Sovereign rights and conservation of natural resources, carried out in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone and in the continental shelf  of the Russian Federation;
? The freedom of the high seas; including freedom of navigation, operation, fisheries, re-
search, freedom to lay submarines and pipelines.
The fact that the continental shelf is emphasized is another way of stating that the ar-
eas that Russia claims are part of its policy. In the objectives it is clearly listed that Russia pursuits
for “realization and protection of sovereign rights over the continental shelf of the Russian Federa-
tion for exploration and exploitation of its resources”.153 Hence, according to the Maritime Doctrine
the continental shelf would be kept as a strategic reserve. It argues the Navy to be one of the tools
for the foreign policy of Russia and it is designed to protect the interests of the country by military
methods, the maintenance of military-political stability in the adjacent seas, military security with
marine and ocean areas.154
The Doctrine contains a representation of Russia as a historical and geographical sea
power, which has sovereignty to act as a global actor, which has natural access to three oceans and a
long history of naval activities and research155. Even when the Doctrine did not offer that much of a
new view on the Arctic areas as such, it brought up a tendency or a demand for more widely organ-
ized and motivated utililization of the naval areas. It means all the maritime activities, economical
together with military to be put under development at the same time and under the same command.
To achieve this goal a new instrument, a Maritime Council, was set up to pursue for an overall co-
ordination of maritime activities in its tasks as well as the supervision of the execution of the mari-
time doctrine. In this way also the soviet concept of ‘mastering the north’ could have been seen as
brought back to the discourse.
152 MD 2001,2.
153 MD 2001,2-3.
154 MD MD 2001,8-9.
155 MD 2001.
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As of 2001 Russia really kicked speed to the political debate over the Arctic space
with its submission to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the most influen-
tial regime for maritime borders and for solving the disputes, but even this agreement applies only
partially to the Arctic basin156. The submission proposed to move the outer limits of Russia’s conti-
nental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.157 Perhaps not surprisingly there was an immediate response by other littoral states
of the Arctic Ocean and especially USA reacted to Russia’s claim to have Lomonosov Bridge,
which is located in the seabed of Arctic Ocean and reaches up to the North Pole. An international
recognition of this claim would have increased the exclusive economic zone of Russia by 1, 2 mil-
lion square kilometres158. Thus, Russia’s claim was almost the size of the Soviet territorial waters.
To this claim United Nations demanded more evidence, but it was obvious that the Russian dis-
course on ownership of the region grew stronger.
Russia presented a new claim in August 2007 and gained much publicity with an expe-
dition made by two mini submarines, led by a famous scientist, and later the special representative
of the President in the Arctic, Artur Chilingarov. They planted a titan-made flag on the sea bed in
the North Pole. Thus they proved Russia's ability to act in the north and also started the interna-
tional media debate, if the Arctic was becoming an area for a race for the natural resources and ter-
ritorial claims. The act was seen as a symbolical attempt to legitimize the territorial claim sent to the
UN earlier. The expedition was acknowledged by the political leaders in Russia as a scientific epi-
sode and they emphasized that the disputes should be solved in an appropriate international setting.
Putin declared shortly after Chilingarov’s 2007 expedition this “cocksure” bid to the UN was com-
ing, but no new bids were sent. The maps sent by Moscow have said to be too unclear, the detailed
maps collected by Chilingarov stay secret.159 One of the challenges Russia is facing, is that the UN
preferably would make decision, if there would be scientific evidence on the Lomonosov and Men-
deleyev ridges. But the country lack in the technology, by which rock samples and other type of re-
searchable objects could be collected. According to the specialist, geophysical and seismological
156 Under international law, the Arctic five countries have 200-mile exclusive economic zone in the Arctic. Moreover
under the UNCLOS (United Convention on the Law of the Sea) a country can show its continental shelf beyond this
limit and thus claim more of the ocean floor.
157 UN 2009.
158 Baev 2010,7.
159 Baev 2010.28.
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methods do not substitute the deep sea drilling160. For now it seems that to get the samples Russia
would need international cooperation, which it is more than hesitant to do in the issues concerning
the continental shelf.
5.2.2. Sovereign Rights and Possibility for a Confrontation
According to the Wikileaks material, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky has assessed the
situation in the North in August 2008 in the following way:
“While in the Arctic there is peace and stability, however, one cannot exclude that in
the future there will be a redistribution of power, up to armed intervention.161”
Because of the strategic importance of the Arctic, the state maintains a certain level of
control over the operations in the area.  In July 2008, President Medvedev signed a law on Arctic
resources, according to which the research for possible energy resources from the continental shelf
will be allowed only to the companies picked by the government. In other words, the government is
empowered to choose companies to develop resource extraction on the continental shelf. Medvedev
commented on the law by saying “The continental shelf is our national heritage”, which was inter-
preted as indicating that the development of the Arctic will be left to Russian state-led companies.
When further asked about the cancellation of auctions, Medvedev said “This was done consciously
to ensure rational use of this national wealth”162.
As it says in the Russian Arctic Paper (2008), Russia needs to secure its borders in the
Arctic to “exercise on this basis Russia’s competitive advantage in the production and transport of
energy resources163.” Further the paper stated that there is a need for “establishing a Russian Fed-
eration Armed Forces group of conventional and other forces, military formations, and bodies
(above all border guard forces) in the Russian Federation’s Arctic zone, capable of guaranteeing
military security in various military-political situations”. Moreover the fact that the Security Coun-
cil of the Russian Federation released the arctic paper reveals that Russia’s main focus was in the
Arctic is military development rather than tackling the socio-economic questions in the first hand.
Overall, the sovereignty discourse emphasized the military presence to ensure the national interest.
160 This was stated by the director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Oceanography Institute. NG 2009a.
161 Greenpeace 2009.
162 Harding 2009, TOR 2009.
163 Arctic Paper 2008.
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Quite soon the situation was clarified in the media that the bottom line in the strategy paper was to
ensure more border guards to the Arctic, not a quest to have it militarized.
The Arctic Paper points out that “Russia will create by 2020 a new group of forces to
protect its political and economic interests in the Arctic.” To this Admiral V. Popov, the former
commander of the Northern Fleet clarified that “That is not about the creation of a new strike force.
The military component will be optimized to accomplish new tasks. [Referring to arctic group of
forces] The main focus will be on tasks performed by border guards.”164
After that the international community might have had expectation that Putin would
have continued and strengthened the new type of more assertive discourse on sovereign rights, it
could have continued from his (often interpreted as aggressive) Munich Security Conference
speech165 and the sudden war in the summer of 2008 against Georgia. The National Security Strat-
egy (2009) emphasized the sovereignty discourse by stating that Russia managed to overcome the
political, social and economic crisis of the 1990’s and now it has a restored possibility to protect its
national interests. Further the strategy sees the transition from bloc politics to the multilateral di-
plomacy and resource potential of Russia and its pragmatic policy expand opportunities of the Rus-
sian Federation to strengthen its influence on the world stage.166 The strategy’s representation of
the energy resources is central; they are depicted as more and more crucial and strategically impor-
tant in the future. In this discourse further the possible confrontation in the Arctic areas is noted. It
could be said that Russia went in its Security Strategy far beyond usual diplomatic discourse over
the resources with stating that “we cannot rule out the use of force to resolve problems that arise in
the competitive battle for resources.”167
5.2.3. Strategic resources
Soon after the financial crisis hit on the Russian budget it also forced the country to
look for new investors in its energy complex and in the Arctic. The law signed in 2008 by Mr. Putin
limiting foreign investment in strategic sectors including energy seemed to be inappropriate only a
year after. In 2009 Natural Resources Minister Y. Trutnev said that investment legislation prevents
the development of natural resource investigations, because Gazprom and Rosneft are investing too
164 RIA 2009.
165 Which has often be said to have reflections from the Cold War rhetorics.
166 Security Strategy (SS) 2009.
167 SS 2009.
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little. Further Putin asked for new investors with the cooperative manner: “we are looking for new
partnerships and want you to feel that you are part of our team.”168  Very little interest was ap-
pointed at that time towards the new Arctic investigations, maybe due to the financial crisis, but
also the lessons learnt from cooperation in the Russia’s Far East in Sakhalin.
The content of the discourse on sovereign rights has been in a flux towards the end of
the research period; even the officers have adopted some parts of the discourse. Interestingly, the
tasks of the naval forces could have been argued to have been changing; wider spectrums of duties
have been introduced, amongst them assisting the energy technology and infrastructure. In 2009
deputy chief of staff of the Russian Navy, vice admiral O. Burtsev stated: "It cannot stay away from
this issue and Russia, for which the Arctic region is not only hydrocarbons, but an area of combat
training of submarine crews." He noted that the Russian submariners have extensive experience
diving under the ice. Thus, the potential of Russia as an Arctic actor was again represented.169
Russia has throughout the history been emphasizing the bilateral relations over the in-
tergovernmental arenas and thus also the Security Strategy (2009) states that the transition in world
politics from bloc politics to multilateral diplomacy might strengthen Russia's influence. The paper
further represented the resource potential that would strategically guarantee Russia's influence.170
5.2.4. Sovereign rights and remilitarization of the Arctic
 A metaphor of the reviving naval power of the Russian Federation could be the titan-
made flag that was placed to the sea bottom underneath the North Pole in 2007171. The two vessels
were not operating in high sea areas, which are rich in natural resources, instead their expedition
went to areas where foreign ships might be able to move freely and possibly pose a threat to Rus-
sia’s security. Moreover in August 2007 a Russian researcher, Sergei Balyasnikov from the Russian
Arctic and Antarctic Institute stated: “It's a very important move for Russia to demonstrate its po-
tential in the Arctic... It's like putting a flag on the Moon”172. Russia's manoeuvre to claim the Arc-
tic areas around it to own possession reflected reaction from other Arctic countries condemning
168 Ekspert-Ural 2009. More on cooperative discourse in Chapter 5,1.
169 RIA 2009b.
170 SS 2009.
171 BBC 2007.
172 Ibid.
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such allegedly archaic practices173. Hence, in the May 2010 Prime Minister Putin told members of
the Russian Geographic Society, that:
“There has been much ado around the Arctic region. You know how the [Russian] flag was
erected [on the seabed] and how negatively our neighbours reacted to this. Nobody has ever
stopped them from erecting their own flags. Let them do it. But we work under the rules es-
tablished by the United Nations and in line with international maritime laws.174”
The quote shows, how the Russian potential is represented; something that is impor-
tant to Russia, but simultaneously not meant to be an assertive action to claim the Arctic. Russia
wants to emphasize the international law in problem solving.
Thereafter in 2009 the National Security Document represented the situation in the
north, that “in competition for resources, it cannot be ruled out that military force could be used for
resolving emerging problems175”. Further it had a message that “the existing balance of forces near
the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can be violated”. President Medvedev talked
about the security threats arising from global climate change; in this speech he saw the situation
with other countries in the Arctic region becoming more and more active in the High North. The
other actors were perceived attempting to limit Russia’s access to explore and develop its Arctic
energy deposits, was “inadmissible from legal point of view and unfair in terms of Russia’s geo-
graphical location and very history.”176 At the same time, interestingly in the Military Doctrine of
Russian Federation (2010), one can find no reference of threat from the Arctic.
Concerning the assertive discourse of Russia's ownership over the Arctic areas, it is
good to note that already the Maritime Doctrine represented a particular importance of free access
to the Atlantic. Another crucial role was played by the Northern Sea Route. Although the reference
is made to the military means; there were actually no requests or efforts by neither the Defence
Ministry nor the government to beef up the presence. Consequently this situation somewhat
changed in the spring of 2011, when Putin declared new types of Arctic brigades will be established
in the Russian Arctic. The Arctic brigades according to the chief editor of the journal “Russia in
Global Affairs” were probably never to be used. “Russia only expresses the seriousness of its
173 Ingram & Dittmer & Dodds & Moisio 2009.
174 RIA 2010.
175 National Security Document 2009.
176 Medvedev 2010.
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claims. Two brigades are only a symbol of this intention.” Furthermore he refers to the brigades as
hypothetical.177
The Russia had a plan that it would claim the territory lying beyond its current eco-
nomic zone by the end of 2010 and thus establish its outer borders further in the Arctic by 2015178.
The ongoing discourse and the actual claims suggest that the sovereignty and the borders in the
Russian north are actually very important to the country. In June 2011 Prime Minister Putin said to
the ruling United Russia party meeting, that
“We are open for a dialogue with our foreign partners and with all our neighbours in
the Arctic region, but of course, as far as our own geopolitical interests are concerned,
we shall be protecting them firmly and consistently179”
Further during the summer of 2011, Russia conducted more explorations to collect
evidence on the continental shelf (More on p.44). Admiral Vysotsky was asked in reference to the
growing importance of the Arctic, what are the tasks for the naval forces. He answered:
“Currently in the Arctic areas Russia is facing a wide range of challenges and threats
that can adversely affect the economic interests of our country. Russian policy to-
wards the Arctic is to enhance peaceful settlement of disputes and cooperation. The
task of ensuring the economic activity of Russia in the sea off the agenda has not been
removed. The situation requires developing and upgrades the combat potential of the
Pacific and Northern Fleets. In general, the Defence ministry believes that the imple-
mentation of targeted bases of state policy in the Arctic in 2020 and beyond will en-
hance Russia's status as a leading arctic power, the strengthening of its security and
sustained economic development.180”
So the discourse of the naval force had turned to emphasize the peaceful cooperation and the impor-
tant economic activities in the Arctic. The answer to the suspicions that the establishment of the arc-
tic brigades faces, Vysotsky explained the challenges the northern areas of Russia are facing, and
how they could be solved:
“You already know that the decision to create two brigades to protect the interests of
Russia in the Arctic. In creating these teams we take into account the experience of the
177 NG 2011.
178 Maritime Doctrine 2001,7.
179 Moscow Times 2011.
180 RIA 2011a.
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armed forces of Finland, Norway and Sweden, where such compounds exist long
ago.181”
He added that the interest in the Arctic is increasing; it is not only Russia, but also
other countries, outside the traditional thought of “Arctic actors”, who are showing their interest.
According to him, the actions of these countries have a systematic, coalition nature. Amongst them,
Vysotsky said that China, Japan and Korea and other (not so) “well-known Arctic countries, such as
Malaysia and Thailand have showed interest. And this might only be the beginning182.”
In the sovereign rights discourse the representations of national interest and national se-
curity are important. National Security is explained in the Arctic paper as:
“state of protection individuals, society and state from internal and external threats and
enforcing constitutional rights, freedom, decent quality and standard of living of citizens; sover-
eignty, territorial integrity and sustainable development, defence and security of the state183”
These factors are presented in many policy papers, as well as in speeches as a metaphor
for Russia’s growing geopolitical interest on the Arctic. Moreover the national interest has been the
core term when talking about military presence in the Arctic. Overall assessment of Russia’s mili-
tary capacity with the focus in the European North, the sovereignty discourse could be at times been
interpreted as assertive and some of the actions as remilitarization of the Arctic. Nevertheless, the
notable weaknesses in Russia’s strategic posture in the north make it senseless to consider re-
launching a military brinkmanship to the North. To add to this Moscow would hardly be able to im-
press its potential competitors. In reference to the assertive policies, the resumption of Russia’s arc-
tic military activity does actually pose a threat of accidents but raises safety concerns. Overall, the
question of the discourse on Russia’s sovereign rights is not about international security cooperation
or maritime safety, but more of a showcase of Russia military heroics.
5.3. Discourse on modernization
“If St. Petersburg is Russia’s window to Europe then Murmansk is the gateway to the world.
Ambitious projects to have a corridor from Europe to North America and Pacific would be taken
more seriously in developed surroundings.”184
181 RIA 2011a.
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Especially during President Medvedev’s modernization has been high in the political
discourse. He has pursued for more innovative and technology-friendly policies in Russia. The
modernization discourse has been his key proposition for overcoming financial crisis as well as the
country’s dependency on petro revenues. The discourse of modernization is penetrating many
specific areas of political life in Russia, also the Arctic. The three representations in this discourse
are the modernization of the maritime infrastructure and the fleet, economic modernization and the
social and innovative modernization. An interesting point in the modernization discourse in
reference to the Arctic is that already the Maritime Doctrine stated in 2001, that the principle of the
fleet should be changed and there should be development for the unification of the infrastructure in
relevance to the military and to the country’s economic needs185. This was also the question a
couple of years later, when the Baltic Fleet was assigned to secure the building process of the Nord
Stream pipeline and secure the economic interests of the Russian Federation.
5.3.1. Modernization of the Fleet and the Infrastructure
The logic behind the argumentation is that after the ice-free months in the north are
getting longer, Russia’s own potential to act in the north should be guaranteed. At the moment
Russia has more than a thousand ships with a total of deadweight of around 15 million tonnes.
However, more than 60 percent of this tonnage is transported under foreign flags. Russia’s own
Navy provides only four percent of their foreign shipping. The ruling United Russia party activated
on marital issues on 2006, when it decided to start a project called “St. Petersburg - the Sea Capital
of Russia” A special representative of the President of the Russian Federation in international co-
operation in the Arctic and the Antarctic Chilingarov (Also on p.46), was appointed as the
coordinator of the project .186 Prime Minister Putin said in St. Petersburg in 2009 that “We need an
icebreaker fleet, we need these kinds of ships, in the Arctic, and here, in the Baltic, to serve the
growing volume of shipping187” but the fact is that the shipping is not growing (at least yet) and
most of the ships are foreign. Furthermore Russia would in this sense need to develop its innovative
sector and investment policies. Paradoxically, even the Chilingarov’s expedition in 2007 was
sponsored partly by foreign investors188”. Moreover it is not just the fleet, but also the infrastructure
185 MD 2001,4.
186 He is also “an outstanding Russian oceanologist, Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of the Russian Federation,
a Doctor of Geographic Sciences, a Corresponding Member of Russian Academy of Science.” Global Port 2011.
187 Trenin 2010, 18.
188 Trenin 2010,18.
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is seen as a target for modernization plans; Vladimir Mihailitsenko, a captain of the Northern Fleet
has argument:
“Russian ports in the Arctic are in terrible condition. From all of the key ports in the
Northern Sea Route from the Kara Strait to the Bering Strait, Anadyr is the most
modern - thanks to the ex-governor Abramovich. Even Dudinka, owned by Norilsk
Nickel desperately needs modernization.”189
Also other ports in the Russian north are owned by companies that work on basis of
business and profit, not like during the Soviet times, when there was also a social responsibility to
keep workplaces in the city. Obviously after the Soviet disintegration many towns in the periphery
have suffered from losses in the infrastructure, industry and investments. Moreover the
modernization refers also to the wider global possibilities. Mihailitsenko sees opportunities in Asia:
“In general there are not enough ports in the northern regions (…) Lena River
Shipping Company, which manages the port in Yakutia, has been waiting since 2006
for the completion of the railway to Yakutsk. When it is finally built, the port will
have new customers and maybe even interest to these transport facilities from China
will materialize.”
Overall, the discourse on modernization is not just on the highest state-level, but in the
minds of people. It is represented as something hopeful and definitely needed. Admiral Vladimir
Kuryedov, who was the head of the Naval Forces from 1997-2005 said in 2005 after another deadly
accident that the Russian Navy has stepped on a rake. This same officer asked for a resign of his
post after the Kursk disaster, but Putin did not allow him to. In these two cases the accusations were
pointed at the commanders of the Northern Fleet. Admiral Masorin, who lead the Navy from 2005-
2007 was famous for his loud statements about large-scale plans to modernize the fleet. For
example in June 2007 he promised that there would be six new aircraft carriers and a notable
number of new ships, raising the fleet to 300 battleships.190 He was not responsible for this type of
projects and was sacked shortly after.
Overall, the problem with the modernization discourse seems to be, that it does not
apply to the real life. The Arctic modernization projects seem to be hard to motivate to the people.
Secondly, large share of the money allocated to the state-run mega projects will slip to someone's
pocket, not to the actual project. Thus, a need for more supervision over the actors in the north is
189 Ogonyok 2010a.
190 Kommersant 2005.
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needed. It should be questioned; has the Maritime Strategy or the Arctic Strategy actually helped in
modernization of the North, or do they just maintain the discourse?
In 2008 president Medvedev stressed that the financial crisis should not effect on the
modernization of the Russian Armed Forces, “our country has now power and means to actualize
the plans – not like in the 90’s, when we can actually say that there was a failure of upgrading the
armed forces and naval forces as part of it.”191 Russian Arctic Strategy Paper (2008) underlined the
resource base and Arctic shipping routes as Russia’s future for economic development and
modernization.
In president Medvedev’s speech in 2009, given in the Sevmash shipyard about the
future prospects of the Russian underwater naval forces, the main points were that the problems
have remained the same, but the problem of today is, that not all the production capacity is used as
is should be. In Medvedev’s opinion the emphasis should be put on creating competitive modern
technology, which would also meet the quality requirements of foreign countries192. Further the
President noted in 2010 in a Security Council meeting, that it is important to establish new financial
and institutional mechanisms and incentives for companies to modernize their technology,
particularly in the Arctic areas, which are absolutely crucial for studying climate change193.
Lately Putin has talked more about humane prospects of the Arctic, in the 2010 Arctic
forum he emphasized; “there is a need to create top-quality, comfortable living conditions for local
people and pursuit for a frugal attitude towards the indigenous people of the High North”194.
It is not very common for Putin to represent the modernization discourse, but he often
involves other types of words to emphasize, that Russia needs development and innovation. At the
same speech he proposed, that there should be an active exchange of ideas, innovations and
practical experience in the Arctic areas.195 Thus, it can be noted that when the investments and the
modernization of the infrastructure of the north is sometimes hard to motivate, the feature of soft
values will step into the discourse. No-one is against of guaranteeing better living conditions for the
people, but many might not agree on investments to an obscure region as Arctic.
191 Arctic Paper 2008.
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Recently Russian governmental actors have discovered that many of the Russian
vessels only existed on paper and actually many of the vessels had been leased to foreign companies
with long contracts. This affected the developing plans and expeditions in the North, part of which
then has been committed with the help of Norwegian and Canadian actors’.196 One has to remember,
that when talking about quantity, even in the Soviet times, when the financing of the Navy was
guaranteed, not all the ships of the Russian Navy where in battle condition simultaneously. It has
been estimated, that the amount was about 10-15%, when for example in the USA half of the ships
are always out of the bases. Russian scientists have recently gained much more funding on the
Arctic issues, even a new university has been set up in Arkhangelsk, after Putin’s decree in 2010197.
There has been much trust to the Russian scientific community to help to prove the political claims
and state of affairs regarding to the continental shelf in the Arctic.
In the summer of 2011 a new ice-breaker called “St. Petersburg” was put into opera-
tion. Another called “Moscow” is also in progress. It was estimated that Russian shipbuilding in-
dustry and orders to also foreign shipyards are in rapid growth. Russia’s political will to invest
heavily on its icebreaker fleet means not only new expeditions are more capacity in the Arctic, but
more capacity for development of its shipbuilding industry and infrastructure of the north. Invest in
the icebreaking fleet may “be paid back sooner than we think”, because the Arctic shelf can thus be
explored198.
5.3.2. Social, Innovative and Secure Modernization
The Arctic strategy (2010) is a paper concentrating on modernization, since the pur-
pose of this strategy is to pursue for
“innovative modernization of the economy and sustainable growth to ensure the na-
tional security in the waters and land-based regions, as well as individual safety and
security of the population, further to strengthen the role and place of the Arctic region
in the economy of the Russian Federation.199”
The analyzed goals in the Arctic Strategy were to be achieved with an eight-step
programme; they all related to the development of scientific knowledge, to modernization of the
196 RBK 2008.
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governance and to investments into human capital. Moreover the Strategy also listed other points
for further development; the legal system, sharing the foreign and local know-how and the
modification of the economy in the north. Thus, all of the development goals in the Strategy
contributed to the modernization discourse. Obviously the Arctic Strategy was expressly for the
development of the Arctic region – not for example stabilizing or peacefulness of this area. The
representation of the ‘development’ in the modernization discourse is interesting; it refers to
something neutral and positive, whereas stabilizing might refer to an unstable situation at the
moment. Furthermore modernization is thought to strongly present President Medvedev’s policies,
so this type of naming is probably the most neutral way.
In the summer of 2011 commander-in-chief of the Russian Fleet, admiral Vysotsky
was asked about the consequences of the Maritime Doctrine, which was being adopted ten years
ago. The answer of the highest naval officer in Russia was interesting. Seemed like the national in-
terest of the Russia had become include much larger section of the state policy, than before. Also
the modernization discourse was presented, but not as modernization of the Navy, but as sustain-
able economic development:
“Obviously, the naval activity should be sufficient for providing military security, but
also to endorse sustainable economic development. Russia has a wide range of na-
tional interests in military, economic, international, information, border, ecological
and other spheres, the protection of which is connected with the Naval forces in the
world ocean.200”
Certainly the reasoning has moved from the ‘modernization of the Navy’ discourse
closer to the current message of the political leaders as well, that the tasks of the Navy are not just
(traditional) military, moreover the tasks are more and more interlinked with a wider spectrum of
national interest. The discourse has turned to support the wider understanding security. Vysotsky
continued:
“Above all, (the interest is in) ensuring a safe access to the Russian resources and to
the oceans, further the development and management of natural resources for socio-
economic development is important, as well as preventing a domination of any state or
military-political blocs. The latter is of great importance to the national interests of
Russia, especially in the surrounding seas.201”
200 RIA 2011a.
201 RIA 2011a.
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Admiral Vysotsky admitted in July 2011 that Arctic is growingly important to Russia,
since "Right now a broad spectrum of challenges and threats is being concentrated in the Arctic."
He reiterated that NATO might be a source of a tension because the alliance has "marked the Arctic
as a zone of its own interests.202"
To sum up, modernization discourse contains the representations of the retrieval of the
developed, innovative and socially equal north, which can thus produce well-being. Moreover it
includes a prospect of rebuilding not just the armed forces and naval fleet in the north, but also the
cargo potential and the infrastructure. The innovations and new equipments would thereby used for
economic purposes in the high north and for higher level of utilization of the energy resources and
logistic possibilities. As a whole the socio-economic and humane side of the modernization
discourse has grown in importance towards the end of the research period. This aspect was specially
acknowledged in the latest policy document, the Arctic Strategy.
6. Discussion
The Russian geopolitical thinking might at first seem to be following the economic in-
terest of the country, but in deeper look it is maintaining the national interest and the pursue for re-
storing the great power status of Russia. Moreover, the Arctic policy of Russian Federation is much
more varied than it might seem at first sight. According to the research material, characteristic to the
geopolitical thinking of the Russian Federation in the arctic areas is a balancing situation between
on the one hand the sovereign rights and the traditional security threats, and on the other hand the
cooperation with other Arctic states in reference to the development and to the economic issues in
the north. Overall, the Russian geopolitical thinking also contains elements of the wider security
conception, with guarantying the economic interest and stability of the area. According to this re-
search material, there was three discourses traced; discourse on cooperation, on Russia’s sovereign
rights and on modernization.
All the discourses link together; it is important that the cooperative discourse is main-
tained to achieve the economic goals, which are also closely linked to the discourse on moderniza-
202 Time 2011.
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tion. Again, an important aspect in the Russian geopolitical thinking is to maintain and secure the
national interest and sovereignty of the country. National interest usually refers to the natural re-
sources and to the discourse on sovereign rights of Russia (Chapter 5.2). According to the sover-
eignty discourse, the aim is to have a sovereign power over the Arctic regions and moreover to
maximize the ownership of the possible resources in the region. Simultaneously the sovereignty
discourse might also lead to the country’s isolation from the existing cooperation in the area. By
comparison, Moscow might assume that the ‘position of strength’ leads to a more flexible situation
in the cooperation and in the possible confrontation in the Arctic. Instead it is, for its part, enhanc-
ing the atmosphere of unreliability and mistrust. The Russian geopolitical thinking on the Arctic has
elements of a global great power discourse, but emphatically the aim is to have the status as an Arc-
tic great power.
6.1. Russian Geopolitical Thinking on the Arctic
According to John Agnew’s concepts of modern geopolitical imagination, Russia sees
the Arctic as natural and sovereign part of the country. Russian geopolitical thinking in the north
relates closely to the ‘geopolitical’ and ‘national’ interests of the country. They are used almost in-
terchangeably.
Consequently the concept of ‘strategic importance’ is important in the geopolitical
thinking; it refers to the significance of the geographical area as such, but also to the importance of
many sectors closely linked to the Arctic. The strategic meaning is further being essentialized in the
Russian geopolitical thinking by raising it to the most essential characteristic of the region. Fur-
thermore the nature of the north is pivotal feature in the Russian geopolitical thinking. The nature of
the Arctic is represented as something particularly special, different and remote, but simultaneously
it is the nature that offers premise for the resources, which are central in the thinking. Lastly the na-
ture of the Arctic is being exotized in the Russian geopolitical thinking, due to its extraordinary
character.203
 Geopolitical thinking of the Russian Federation is representing the country as a sov-
ereign great power of modern world. Or at least the ‘great powerness’ is the ultimate goal. Never-
theless, some of the discourses refer to the Russia’s eminence as an ‘Arctic power’, rather than as a
203 Concepts were explained in the chapter 4.5.
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global player (pp.49, 56-57). Again, the Russian geopolitical thinking concentrates on the national
interests and securing the role of the country now and maintaining the influence in the future. Ac-
cording to Agnew’s theory of modern geopolitical imagination, Russia has acted according to a
‘global vision’; it is part of the international society, by its cooperative discourse and by often high-
lighting the role of the international law. Nevertheless, it is often acting according to its own ‘na-
tional interest’.
Second aspect from modern geopolitical imagination, concept of translation time into
space in the case of the Arctic, offers at least two viewpoints. Firstly, a need for a modernization
and the future prospects in the Arctic makes the Russian arctic in its geopolitical thinking as some-
thing ‘outdated’ and ‘passé’. Moreover it has a representation of something that was developed ear-
lier, but then left aside without a notice. In turn, the potential in the Arctic affects to the thinking
and represents it as ‘promising’ and ‘auspicious’. The contrast of these two representations is pre-
sent not just in the Arctic, but in the Russia geopolitical thinking in a wider scale; there is often
something outdated, ‘retro’ or nostalgic, but also a hint of a future potential and discourse of high
expectations.
During the research period (2000-2011) the intensity in the discourses found shifted
slightly; in the speeches of the political leaders some environmental and more humane aspects were
represented towards the more recent days. Also the personal differences of Putin and Medvedev
were noted; Putin’s ambition was to rebuild the Navy as part of the armed forces, to gain the honour
and glory of the Soviet armed forces back. In turn, Medvedev supported the idea of modernization,
mainly to attract new innovations and to update the equipment to the meet the demand of the con-
temporary technology. During his presidency the discourse has shifted more to view the supporting
role in economic functions as part of the tasks for armed forces. Consequently, the biggest attention
to the rebuilding of the fleet were started during the Putin’s presidency, moreover the modernization
discourse by Medvedev fitted very well to the same goals. Again, the presidencies of these men also
happened in different economic situations; during Putin’s presidency Russia was gaining immense
petro revenues whereas during the Medvedev’s post the financial crisis hit hard to the economy.
The Arctic debate has recently concentrated mostly to the issues that are related to the
arctic sea areas, such as the continental shelf and the energy resources. Historically, but also cur-
rently the importance of the naval and commercial fleet is of great worth in the north. Thus, the
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sources commenting on military aspects gave more perspective to the research204.  The officers pre-
sumably had the strongest reasoning on Russia’s sovereign rights and on 'national interest' in the
Arctic. Secondly their interest is to have the vessels modernized. These two priorities were quite
expected. To reach their interests the threat perception is characterized to include NATO or the
‘west’, but also other arctic states and states that have expressed their interest in the Arctic205.
The strategic importance of the possible economic benefits gained from the High
North is further said to trigger unstable situation in the north. A valuable movement for the future
development of the naval forces has been towards the end of the research period, when also these
actors have started supporting the economic goals of the political elite, such as the energy extraction
and growing cargo business. Furthermore their representations have turned to seeing the energy re-
sources as strategic goods of the country. The interaction between the Russian Naval Forces and the
energy industry might also be growing, since during the recent years the vessels of the naval forces
have gone through an enormous facelift and received tasks of securing the underwater pipelines and
energy resources.
There are some contradictions in the Russian geopolitical thinking and in the dis-
courses of the political elite; firstly, cooperation in the energy extraction is needed at the same time
as the Russia’s sovereign ownership for the possible future findings should be sealed. Secondly, the
Arctic appears to be the strategic treasure trove for the country, which secures the future economic
growth and sustainable stability, but at the same time President Medvedev has many times empha-
sized the need and demand for the modernization and to get rid of the energy revenues as a funda-
mental guarantee of the development of the country. President Medvedev’s key propositions for
overcoming dependence on petro revenues were far from anything to do with the Arctic; space
technology, nuclear energy, information technology, energy efficiency and pharmaceutics.206 Large
icebreakers and other heavy equipment for operating in the far north remain to be the tools of trade
and development of the far north, rather than nanotechnology and pharmaceutics. Energy revenues
have provided the financial lifeline of the country, but have simultaneously reduced incentives for
modernizing Russian industry and much-needed structural reforms. The energy and mineral wealth
has actually not served as the facilitator and financer of economic reforms and modernization, as it
204 Even though e.g. officers are usually thought to not to take part in political life.
205 Recently also growing Asian powers, such as China, have been included in the threat perception, even in the Arctic.
206 Medvedev 2010.
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appears in the discourse; unquestionably it has subsidized the old economic system and enabled the
prolongation of actual modernization.
The financial crisis of the last few years affected the energy sector and especially the
planned investment schedules; moreover it hit hard on the investment schedules in the Arctic ar-
eas207. Nevertheless, in the political discourse and to the Arctic policies of the country it had very
little influence. One could say that the global market situation after the crisis is not the same as be-
fore; the oil and gas markets have changed and the prospects are much more unstable. The unstable
situation in the gas market and in the big oil-producing countries in the Middle-East is helping also
the Russian north to stabilize and even to raise its position in the market. Anyhow, the quest for
more oil and gas is on, and the openings of the Nord Stream pipeline did not slow down or decrease
the importance of the Arctic energy sources.
6.2. Sabre-Rattling or Just Domestic Politics?
The most tension or highest activities were in the Russian politics in the Arctic during
the years 2007-2009.  At that time the expedition to the Arctic sea was conducted, simultaneously
the Russian Arctic paper was published. After 2009 the activities were quieter, until the mid-2011,
when Putin stated that there is a new claim coming to the United Nations over the possible expan-
sion of Russia’s economic zone beyond the standard 200-mile limit. Simultaneously the new Arctic
brigades were announced. More generally, the political discourse during the financial crisis of 2008
onwards in my opinion shifted from extraction and exploration plans to guaranteeing the territories
to Russia in the foreseeable future. Hence also the task of the Navy was becoming more mixed with
the commercial fleet. It could be argued that Russia is putting the national interest in front of the
economical ones. The tendency of having protectionist economic policies is not easily fading even
in the north, where cooperation is without fail, needed.
The Arctic is significantly a terrain of nationalistic, great power discourse aimed to the
Russian audience. Various aspects in the discourses of the Russian geopolitical thinking could be
interpreted as apparatus of domestic politics and aimed to the domestic audience. Nevertheless, the
situation and a claim in front of an “own” audience can and should not been threaten differently
207 Due to the financial crisis the Shtokman field explorations were partly postponed, and one option could be to start
the extraction in (easier accessible) Yamal peninsula.
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from the discourses in international arenas. Certainty the most interesting comments in the chosen
material were often the once that were given to the party members. For example in the Arctic Fo-
rum in 2010 Putin’s speech was clearly appointed to the mainly non-Russian specialist audience of
this type of event. He clearly emphasized the natural and social aspects of the high north and of the
indigenous people. He talked about the arctic as a common home for all inhabitants. This speech
was not very typical by Putin, underlining the fact that ecological reasoning has gained presentable
status among the Russian political elite. The tone in his voice could have been different if there
would have been just Russian audience sharing the view on the situation in the north.
Besides the economic and military factors, that are affecting the geopolitical thinking,
also ideational and historical factors play an important role what comes to the geopolitical thinking
of Russia in the Arctic areas. As mentioned earlier, Russia has a long history of ‘special relation-
ship’ with its north. In Soviet times the concept of mastering the north’ (osvoenie severa) was cru-
cial to the planned economy, since many of the natural resources were extracted in the North. Fur-
ther there were projects of boosting more migrants to the north as well as controversial projects of
“helping” the indigenous people with building them new apartments. The ideological importance of
the north was observable especially in Putin’s rhetoric. Putin’s image is to be an action-figure type
of strong leader who with his macho appearance supports the build-up politics of a new, powerful
and self-assured Russia. To add to this, managing and controlling the wilderness and the ‘unknown’
of the north may serve as a reassurance that he is the right man for his post. High North (and the
Russian wilderness) has served as a useful identity-building project, specifically as a platform to
reinforce a great power discourse.
One could claim, that there are numerous acts to diffuse possible tensions in the high
north. For example concerning the Northern Sea Route, there should be an agreement about foreign
ships in Russian waters. The 1982 Convention allows vessel to make ‘innocent passage’ through the
exclusive economic zones and provides for free navigation in the ‘high seas’ beyond208. Further, the
submarines could be forced to go on a surface when approaching exclusive economic zones. On the
contrary Russia is investing heavily on its commercial fleet and to the infrastructure along the
Northern Sea Route and searching for international cooperation in future infrastructure projects.
208 UNCLOS 1982. part 2, Article 8(2), Article 17; part 7, Article 87.
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Explaining and interpreting Russian geopolitical thinking to the Arctic cannot reduce
to the mere military and security policy. Russia has been increasingly active in the cross-border co-
operation and in intergovernmental organizations. Most importantly Russia has last year success-
fully signed an agreement over the maritime border with Norway and thus ended a 40-year border
dispute. This rapprochement has resulted in joint naval exercises and more close cooperation in ma-
rine rescue patrols. It should be noted that even when many have stated that Russia is wowing to
rebuild its naval forces, the amount of newly built ships and bought foreign ships does not keep up
with the pace that the old vehicles are getting into museum value. It is literally process of a rebuild-
ing more than repairing.
The Russian Navy as well as the whole armed forces is embroiled in the same chal-
lenges as the rest of the country. Further the concerns do not differ from the ‘West’ that much; e.g.
rapidly aging population, effects from the global climate change and equipment of the armed forces.
Thus, there is a well justified need for a constructive, complex reform in both the implementation
and monitoring of Russia’s Arctic policies. The need simultaneously rebuild the economic, politi-
cal, and military potentials of Russia, with the goal of restoring the status as a great power is a mas-
sive task.
6.3. Future prospects and solutions
When thinking about future prospects of the region, it would be an exaggeration to
think at the moment that the Arctic Ocean could be declared to be “no man’s land” like the Antarc-
tica, as a natural reserve devoted to peace and science209. Hence, a total demilitarization of the re-
gion is out of the question because the Arctic has a strategic importance not just to Russia, but also
to other states. Overall, the time has gone by for this kind of rhetoric, but the situation with the bor-
ders and natural resources of the north remains unsolved. As for the natural resources, they are be-
coming scarcer in the future. In the end the question is not just about the energy resources, but also
other natural resources, such as the water.
Overall, it will be interesting to see how the situation in the Arctic develops. For sure
the development and modernization of the Arctic (as many things in Russia), are dependent on
global energy market and prices. What if the situation in the Arctic would change to the opposite
209 Antarctic Treaty 1991.
64
direction that we now think? In the worst case scenario Russia would become an energy import
country, due to its failed policies and unrealized investments in the north. Russia’s politics towards
the Arctic or more precisely the success of the policies will determine the future for this energy-
dependent state. There are no guarantees that the oil and gas extraction in the harsh Arctic condi-
tions would be a success story, or even a profitable case, moreover it is not even guaranteed that
there is as much of those resources as some scholars say. In the event of growing oil and gas extrac-
tion from the Arctic, there would also still be the resources available in other parts of the globe, like
in the Middle East. It remains to be seen, how the political regime changes of the spring 2011 affect
to the global energy market.
There was no attempt to form policy recommendations in this paper, but some notions
can be made based on the study. A possible solution to the current, expectant atmosphere could be
that the Arctic actors would enhance both civilian and military cooperation. Overall, the coopera-
tion should stay and grow in all levels of cross-border cooperation, from tourism and student ex-
change to high level political meetings. Visa regime should be removed in reciprocal agreement.
The investment climate should be made more pleasant.
The growing cooperation between Russian and other countries in Arctic issues would
enhance the sosio-economic prosperity and overall modernization of the region. Furthermore, in-
stead of mere ‘cooperation or confrontation’ setting, which is often describing the arctic geopolitics,
according to this research there is also a domestic (Russian) drive for modernization, which is not
based on cooperation with other countries. Hence, the concept of modernization is interesting in
reference to the country’s northern policy. It is repeated, but shown no evidence of actually produc-
ing anything outside the discourse until the recent years. What was crucial and interesting is that the
arctic policy itself has been developing during the research period and only after the Arctic Strategy
Paper in 2008 and the Arctic strategy in 2010 it can be said without reservation to be an independ-
ent policy section in Russian politics.
As for the military presence, both Russia and NATO could try to maintain their mili-
tary presence north of the Arctic Circle in a minimum. In the Arctic areas such fields as environ-
mental, social policy, education, energy and mining fields, but also infrastructure and shipping
could easily be topics for a greater cross-border projects.
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Usually most of the infrastructure investments in Russia are done by state-owned
companies and are colossal in size. Again, it remains to be seen how open the future infrastructure
and other types of mega-size projects in the Russian Arctic will be for foreign companies. The arc-
tic states could try to make their military plans and budgets as open as possible; it would minimize
the potential for misunderstandings and failed interpretations. The countries could provide informa-
tion on their planned military investments in advance and allow more foreign observers to visit their
bases. This would offer a good confidence-building in the relations of the Arctic states.
Russian leaders would have to clarify their meaning of the 2009 National Security
document, or elaborate more on the plans for building more bases in the north and train forces to
specialize in Arctic warfare. There are some mixed messages since at the same time Russian politi-
cal leaders emphasized, that the strengthening of the Arctic presence meant more border guards and
control due to the growing transport in the area. On the other hand, the military exercises in the Arc-
tic should not be treated as something extraordinary; in the end it is the task of the armed forces’ to
analyse and predict possible future scenarios and the country’s ability to react to the possible
threats.
There is a growing need for not only the ‘low politics’ cooperation, but also negotia-
tions in higher level on Arctic issues between Russia and other Arctic states. Russia’s assertive dis-
course over the ownership and the legitimate rights in the Arctic is in sharp contrast to the “west’s”
concern for the fate of the polar bears and in environmental causes. The different agendas were re-
vealed for example, when Russia started the Nord Stream pipeline constructions. In many of the
countries the pipeline project was considered to be a matter of security politics, whereas in Finland
Nord Stream was kept only as an environmental question. In Russia the pipeline was considered to
be “strictly business”, but interestingly about the same time that the process began, the Navy was
assigned to secure Russia’s energy deposits and their shipping.
 Perhaps the best possible and already working framework for cooperation in the mili-
tary sector could be the Arctic Council, which has been a forum in other fields except the military
issues since 1996. On the other hand Russia is usually not so keen on coming to multinational are-
nas, especially on ‘high political’ issues, which the Arctic, due to its strategic interest, apparently is.
The fact that Russia has emphasized the United Nation’s role in disputes and in solving the territo-
rial claims in the Arctic shows, that Russia has a positive view to the United Nations as a global ac-
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tor. As in other cooperation in the arctic, Russia views very little areas that the cooperation should
be in international arenas. Throughout the cooperation different NGO and the EU could offer a new
type of cooperative regime in the high north. While the outcomes out of the international organiza-
tions and other cooperative arenas in the Arctic region have been debated and the content of these
discussions has often been claimed to stay in the safest (non-strategic) zones of cooperation, such as
environmental and social issues, the cooperation has stayed and developed.
Despite the growing interest and possible reasons for a conflict in the north, the condi-
tions for resolution and peaceful development in the Arctic are probably more promising than in
many other regions with similar colliding interests. Firstly, the countries operating in the Arctic
could be characterized as economically developed and politically stable. These types of countries
are more likely to predictable in their policies than so-called less-developed and politically unstable
countries. Secondly, the basis for comprehensive agreements and consensus already exists. More-
over there are already intergovernmental actors that deal with the Arctic issues. The cooperation is
active and growing on issues such as environmental monitoring, maritime search and rescue, this
type of civilian cooperation could have also spill over effect to the security situation in the region.
What comes to different actors in the Arctic areas, the Arctic countries share a com-
mon interest, and particularly the interest is avoiding the Arctic becoming yet another area of insta-
bility. The most significant players – the USA and Russia, are facing much greater challenges in
other parts of the world. Russia could be said to have concerns with is southern and eastern borders,
in addition also keeping an eye on China’s military might. The USA continues to be a notable mili-
tary player in the Pacific and defending the interests of itself in several conflicts in the developing
world.
6.4. Russia and the North
The Russian drive for modernization got hit hard by the global financial crisis, but
more recently it has been shown that the effects were more in the schedule than in the actual pro-
jects. Investments to the Russian Arctic are in increase again. Moreover a breakthrough in the mod-
ernization of Russian Federation would generate projects in the High North and help Russia to fulfil
its ambitious visions in the north. The ultimate risk for Russia’s policy in the Arctic is that it is still
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very fragmented outside the policy level; different ministries and actors are using the ‘Arctic de-
bate’ to lure more budget funding to their policy sectors (economic, infrastructure, military, regional
actors). Overall, the comprehensive and systematic planning and control are lacking behind outside
the strategy level.
In the future Russian geopolitical thinking hopefully gains a strong environmental dis-
course, it seems that there were already mentions about the environmental actors in the research ma-
terial, but it was not at the same level as other discourses. The ecosystem in the Arctic is fragile and
the mishandling the standards and waste may result in irreversible damage and ecocatastrophes. In
June 2011 Putin has admitted:
"We need a really big cleanup for the region and the disposal of litter and fuel barrels,
which have been accumulating around stations, military bases and northern settle-
ments for decades. I was there last year and took a closer look: this is something terri-
ble, litter is lying around in quantities you cannot even imagine, and those barrels are
rusting, leaking substances into the environment.210"
The future prospects for the Russian high north look predominantly bright; the talks
about the ‘Arctic race’ or a possible confrontation in the region are somewhat exaggeration. Over-
all, the Russia discourse over the Arctic could be characterized as hopeful, positive and expectant.
Finally it seems that the financing what President Putin has allocated ten years ago is beginning to
effect the situation in the North. Apart from environmental reservation and clean-up plans, there are
investments to the infrastructure, vessels and industry. The opening shipping lanes intrigues interest
not only from Europe and Russia, but globally. With the Arctic Ocean gaining more navigable days
also the already existing infrastructure gains more attention. The effects are not only seen in the
situation in the cities by the Arctic Ocean, but the growing cargo and other types of usage affect the
cities by the major rivers which flow into the Arctic Ocean, like the river Lena211. In the future Rus-
sia might even think about setting some transit fees to cover the expanses of the infrastructure pro-
jects in the north. Same type of policy has already been introduced to the flights over the vast deso-
late lands of Siberia.
6.5. Is geopolitics still applicable?
210 New Europe 2011.
211 Also other countries, like China, have indicated their interest to the shipping potential in the big rivers in Siberia.
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Geopolitics can in many ways be said to be a term from the past. Geographical space
for a state does not mean the same in the modern world of technological innovations and globalized
production of food. Land is not needed for example for cultivation (in a same scale) as 200 years
ago. Nonetheless, it is an important factor in the identity-building and in nationalistic discourse of a
country. It is the land, which entails the glory and pride of a nation. In Russian the country is called
the motherland (Rodina). Thus, the meaning of geographical space has changed to become an im-
portant tool in patriotic great power discourses of a country. Moreover many of the conflicts are ex-
plained in geopolitical terms even today, at least in Russia. As President Putin has argued, the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union has been a biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.
It would be a mistake to assume that the natural resources are the only potential source
of a conflict in the Arctic areas. The Kremlin is to a large extend not concerned on the acquisitions
of territory for natural resources, but more of keeping foreign powers out of what it regards as a
strategically important possession of its own. As with the disputed areas in the north, it seems that
even if the whole icecap of the Arctic would melt the usable areas for oil and gas would stay relia-
bly close to the shores212. More interestingly however, on top of the globe or for example in the
Russia’s claimed areas between the Lomonosov and Mendeleyev ridges is assumable nothing to
extract. This fact proves that the resources are not the only explanatory reason for the Russia’s
claims over the Arctic areas and to the interest drawn to it.
6.6. Further Research - Different Actors and Variables
As for the extraction of the natural resources in the Arctic waters, Russia does not at
the moment have the ability and the know-how; there is a demand for cooperation. One could think
that since the traditional oil-producing regions of the Soviet Union, such as Kazakhstan and Turk-
menistan became independent, the relative importance of the northern regions, such as Siberia and
the Arctic, has grown. I would argue that the main focus in Russian geopolitical thinking is still in
its southern regions, but the interest is growingly also appointed towards its northeast regions. It is
often stated, that Russia’s north-western regions are the most quiet and peaceful, whereas in the
south the security situation is not always that stable. Moreover the north is gaining interest also
globally, recently also other (non-arctic) actors, such as Japan and China, have showed interest on
212 RIA 2010a.
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the Arctic issues. Again, it will be interesting to see, how the balance in the north will change if
these actors outside the traditional influential countries will join the discussion.
The future research about the Arctic region could involve more non-Arctic actors. The
new shipping lanes will definitely boost the interest of other Asian countries as well, such as Japan
and Koreas. China as a growing power and a new actor in the region could offer interesting pros-
pects. China has an interesting maritime policy otherwise also, so this could add to the picture.
Moreover China has deployed a research ship to investigate the north and thus has clearly showed
interest to become an actor in the Arctic region. To add to this, China has stated that the non-arctic
states should be involved in the discussion and the outer continental shelf and international subma-
rine areas should be announced to be “common human heritage.”213
Speaking of different actors, USA seems to be observing the situation in the Arctic
from a little distance. The fact that the country has not signed the UN’s law on seas seems to lead to
role of a bystander. USA has recently pulled of its permanent air force base from Iceland and for
example reduced the material that it stored in Norway214. Another researchable actor could be the
European Union, since it has offered some initial papers for its Arctic policy. According to Russia's
view, EU should not be involved in the Arctic cooperation more than at the moment. Stronger role
for EU could in Russia's view turn the situation in the north 'unbalanced'.
The investments to the Russian north has not always come to touch the grass root
level; this study can’t say much about the living standards and conditions in the north or about the
situation of the indigenous people. The humane side of this change would be a good title for further
study. One of the problems with Arctic modernization projects seems to be the difficulty in motivat-
ing the importantness to the people. 'The Arctic' in general to Russians something not very concrete,
and they rather want the federal money affect to their own every-day-life and living conditions. In a
poll made during the summer 2011 6% did not know the Arctic was part of the Russia, another 6%
of answer confused with Arctic and Antarctic. Overall, 30% of the 2500 answerers were ready to
213 Spears, 2011.
214 USA has only three ice breakers that are capable working in the arctic areas, whereas Russia has 18, of which seven
are nuclear powered.
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move to the Arctic region, because it is often associated with higher salaries.215 Thus, the Arctic
could be said to have a positive, but not a very emotional image.
Also the environmental questions should be taken into consideration, since there have
been signs that the environmental thinking has been adapted even to the highest political level216.
Consequently with the environmental protection questions the problem of the future global fresh
water deposits can be raised – on this account, the northeast part of the globe is not the one that is to
suffer the most from the lack of fresh water. It has been estimated, that in the future even the con-
frontation over the energy resources could be transformed to conflicts over the fresh water. Thus,
there could be a further research made to map the standpoints of different possible actors and fac-
tors in the Arctic region – even the non-traditional ones.
 Another interesting research topic would be the epistemic community in Russian
Arctic policy. This type of research would scrutinize, who has formulated the interest of the Russian
state, furthermore who is seen to be a powerful person or institution in reference to the country's
policy. Formulation and thickness (or looseness) of the epistemic community in Russian arctic
policy would request interviews on Russian actors and real investigation process. Simultaneously it
would offer new insights to the formulation and to the processes of constructing the policy.
7. Conclusions
During the recent years the Arctic issues have become centre of growing attention es-
pecially in the Arctic countries. Many of them have published their Arctic strategies and the future
prospects for the region’s natural resources, infrastructure and shipping potential, and moreover its
strategic importance of the Arctic areas have been brought to daylight. This paper concentrated on
the discourses found in the reasoning of the Russian political elite, policy papers and specialists on
Arctic and maritime issues. The theoretical framework offered the critical geopolitical orientation of
the International Relations and methodological tools were from Critical Discourse Analysis. Thus,
the socially constructed nature of geographical space was emphasized.
215 Nord News 2011.
216 E.g. Putin 2010.
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In the research material of Russian actors three separate but partly overlapping dis-
courses were traced; discourse on cooperation, on sovereign rights of Russia and on modernization.
Furthermore the goal was to scrutinize more widely, if there is a trend in world politics that the im-
portance of the sea is growing. With the specific look to the Arctic geopolitics it is also possible to
construct more complete picture of the Arctic debate in Russia and lastly, to characterize the geopo-
litical thinking of Russian Federation.
One could claim that Russia’s policy towards its north is weak. It is not consistent;
moreover the results of the policies have been hard to define. The situation has somewhat changed
during the recent years when arctic politics have emerged to the high-level speeches and due to the
publication of Arctic Strategy in 2010. The recent financial crisis effected to the investment plans
and to the Arctic discourses, but more in the schedules than in the actual operationalization. Never-
theless, before the crisis the message was more of emphasizing sovereign rights of Russian Federa-
tion, whereas recently more cooperative discourse has arisen. As mentioned earlier, the Arctic is not
just important in the country's foreign policy, it is emphatically important in domestic politics. Evi-
dently in the scenario of unsuccessful execution of the country’s Arctic policies Russia could even
slip in the role of an energy import country. To add to this, a lack of budget revenues from energy
sector would have dramatic consequences to the Russian society, when currently roughly a half of
the Russian budget comes from the energy sector. In Russian political discourse the Arctic is con-
sidered to be the guarantee for the country’s modernization, the economic growth and moreover, the
great power status.
After the Soviet Union disintegration, a geopolitical reasoning grew stronger in Rus-
sia, nevertheless, the Russian geopolitical thinking is not a homogenous concept, and it is highly
diverse and varies from actor to another. The results of this research suggest that there is a need to
rethink the nature of Russian geopolitical thinking and activities in the Arctic region and especially
the multi-dimensional nature of the Russian political discourse. The discourse on modernization in
reference to the Arctic gives new interesting points of views; at the same time the economic struc-
ture of the state remains unchanged, the political discourse proclaims modernization.
One of the initial ideas was that the growing importance of the Arctic regions in the
World politics has also affected the Russian geopolitical thinking. After this research one can state
that the Arctic has an important share on the concept, but the geopolitical thinking of Russia is not
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reducible just to the north. As stated earlier, northern and north-western territories of the Russian
Federation have recently been the most peaceful and stable and thus more emphasis could have
been drawn to the southeast parts of the country. In the turmoil of last decades Russia could be said
to only been able to react on ad hoc –basis, but due to the stable petro revenues it is recently also
investing more to the future. The worrying trend is that the country is still almost only investing to
the energy and military sectors. A major share of the other investments is from foreign companies
and is not really helping Russia to modernize the structure of its economy.
Second hypothesis was that importance of the sea in world politics has grown. Ac-
cording to this research material there has been growing interest paid to the meaning of world
oceans – The maritime doctrine with its wide range of maritime activities made way to the new co-
operation in the Arctic Sea. Moreover the importance of new (underwater) pipelines emphasizes the
possibilities that new technique has brought. Furthermore the Northern Fleet of Russian naval
forces has received huge investments and remains in the position of the most important fleet of the
country. Also the icebreaking fleet is being strengthened due to the growing economic interest and
shipping possibilities.
Third initial idea was to inspect, what type of meaning does the Arctic have in the
Russian geopolitical thinking. According to the material, ‘Northern’ and ‘Arctic’ have a special
meaning in the Russian discourse; the Arctic is not represented just in the military-security dis-
courses of the country or in reference to the economic prospects, moreover the Arctic is a crucial
part in the ‘national interest’ and ‘sovereignty’ discourses. Russia sees the Arctic region (and its
natural resources) belonging to itself not just because of the historical reasons, but also scientifi-
cally, geographically, mentally and culturally. The north is an important factor in the Russian iden-
tity formation and elementary aspect in the country’s geopolitical thinking. Russia is an Arctic su-
perpower and its strategic thinking towards its northeast regions has not significantly changed since
the Soviet times.
The open questions in the arctic geopolitics are not very easy to solve. Could there be
a multilateral agreement on the usage of the natural resources, kind of what was made over the Ant-
arctica in 1959217? One option is what is knowingly supported by the USA and China, that the Arc-
217 The difference between these areas, nevertheless, remains the same. Whereas Antarctica is a remote continent, not
knowingly rich in natural resources Arctic is rich in resources, and growingly important to the global logistic.
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tic could remain “ownerless” with internationalizing the area as “human’s common heritage”. A
whole another question then is, how this heritage would be reserved and based on whose decisions?
It seems that the different actors have different perceptions about the problems that have to be
solved as well as to the actual process.
One of the key findings in this thesis has been that Russia hasn’t had a clear and sus-
tainable policy towards its Arctic regions. Many of the state policies do not include Arctic questions
and the Arctic Strategy (2010) did not gain any publicity and rather works as s memorandum. The
other finding is that since the Russian policy towards its north has been hazy, also the single state-
ments made in the public by state officials, seem to be overly interpreted. Especially 'western media'
likes to overanalyze the speeches; headlines of ‘the Arctic race’ or ‘strengthening the military pres-
ence’ are according to this data, not always realistic.
Moreover the state of for example, the Russian Fleet in the north was in so bad condi-
tion after the collapse of the Soviet Union that even a slight investing on the area seems to be a
‘great race’. Anyhow, Russia is not the only actor “strengthening” the presence in the north, so have
done e.g. Norway, Canada and China. The trend to give Russia a role of an ‘aggressor’ in the Arctic
affairs is not always justified. Not only the policy of Russia is far more complex than indicated, it
does not differentiate so much from the policies of the other Arctic states. What differs, are the eco-
nomic potential and the need for new investments and modernization of the structure of the econ-
omy. Energy companies as well as the infrastructure in Russia are mostly state-owned and carried
out in different state programmes with federal funding. Thus the geopolitical thinking in state poli-
cies towards the region was important to research.
Critical geopolitics emphasizes that the perception is socially and politically con-
structed. In the case of the Russian geopolitical thinking on the Arctic, the theory is very useful; to
the Arctic regions are not just implemented different sorts of anticipations and hopes, moreover it
bears out the Russian identity as a northern, special country. The Russian geopolitical thinking on
the Arctic sees Russia most of all as an Arctic superpower, and secondly as an international actor.
One could claim that the political boundaries are much more elusive and fluid instead
of stable and changeless, whereas the geographical boundaries are almost unchangeable. This might
be one of the reasons, why Russian actors prefer and found geopolitical reasoning useful. It is clear
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that the Arctic politics of the Russian Federation will show and determine how the state controlled
economy will succeed in the modern world politics.
75
Bibliography
Literature
Agnew, J. (1998), Geopolitics. Re-Visioning World Politics. London; Routledge.
Agnew, J. (2005), Hegemony: the New Shape of Global Power. Philadelphia; Temple university
press.
Dodds, K. (2000), Geopolitics in a Changing World. London; Prentice Hall.
Dugin, A. (1999), Osnovy Geopolitiki: geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii/Myslit prostranstvom
[Foundations of Geopolitics: the geopolitical future of Russia/Thinking spatially].
Moscow; Arctogaia.
Fairclough, N. & Chouliaraki, L. (1999), Discourse in Late Modernity - Rethinking Critical
Discourse Analysis, Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press.
Gramsci, A. (1985), Selections from cultural writings. London; Lawrence & Wishart.
Gorshkov (1975). Laivastot sodassa ja rauhassa. Sotatieteen Laitos. Julkaisusarja 1, Nro3.
Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu.
Hmel'nov, I.N. (2008), Rossijskij flot u bezdny ha kraju [Russian Navy at the edge of the abyss].
Jokinen, Juhila & Suoninen (1993), Diskurssianalyysin aakkoset. Tampere; Vastapaino.
Jokinen, A. & Juhila, K. (2002). ”Diskurssianalyyttisen tutkimuksen kartta”. Published in:
Jokinen, A.; Juhila, K. & Suoninen, E. Diskurssianalyysi liikkeessa.
Tampere; Vastapaino pp. 54-97.
Jokinen, A.; Juhila, K. & Suoninen, E. (2002) Diskurssianalyysi liikkeessa. Tampere;
Vastapaino
Kanet, R. (2007), Russia, Re-Emerging Great Power. (ed.) Houndmills, UK;
Palgrave Macmillan.
Mackinder, H. (1904) The Geographical Pivot of History.
Mahan, A. (1890), The Influence of Sea Power upon History.
Ò Tuathail & Dalby (1998), A Geopolitics Reader. Glasgow; Routledge.
Ò Tuathail, G. (1996), Critical Geopolitics. London; Routledge.
Paltridge, B. (2006), Discourse Analysis; An Introduction London; Continuum.
76
Roger, K. E. (2007), Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power.(ed.) New York; Palgrave Macmillan.
Rowe, E. (2009), Russia and the North.(ed.) Ottawa; University Ottava Press.
Said, E. (1978), Orientalism; Western Concepts of the Orient. New York; Vintage.
Suoninen, E. (1993), ”Kielen käytön vaihtelevuuden analysoiminen” Published in Jokinen,
Juhila & Suoninen; Diskurssianalyysin aakkoset. Tampere; Vastapaino.
Titscher, S. et al. (2000). Methods of text and discourse analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA; Sage.
Van Dijk, T. (2011), Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction. Thousand Oaks, CA;
Sage Publications.
Veselago, F. (2009), Kratkaya Istoriya Russkogo Flota [Brief History of the Russian Fleet].
Scientific articles
Agnew, J & Corbridge, S (1989), “The New Geopolitics: The Dynamics of Geopolitical Disord
er” in Johnson & Taylor (eds) A World in Crisis? Geographical Perspectives.
London; Basil Blackwell.
Baev, P. (2009) “Trouble-Making and Risk-Taking: The North in Russian Military Activities”
in Elana Wilson Rowe (ed.) Russia and the North. Ottawa; Ottawa University Press.
Baev, P. & Trenin, D. (2010), The Arctic – A view from Moscow. Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace.
Blakkisrud, H. (2006), What’s to be done with the North? In: Helge Blakkisrud and Geir
Honneland, (eds.) Tackling Space: Federal Politics and the Russian North.
New York; University Press of America.
Blunde, M. (2009), “The New Problem of Arctic Stability” in Survival vol 51 No.5. pp.121-142
Campbell, D. (2007), “Post-structuralism” Published in T. Dunne, M. kurki & S.Smith (eds.)
International Relations Theories. 203-228 New York; Oxford University press.
Dalby S, (1994), "Gender and critical geopolitics" Published in Environment and Planning
12(5) 595 – 612.
Dalby, S. (2008), “Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The Continued Relevance of Critical
Geopolitics” in Geopolitics 13. pp 413-436.
Dodds, K. (2003), “Cold War Geopolitics” Published in J. Agnew, K: Mitchell &
ÒTuathail (eds.) A Companion to Political Geography 204-218. Blackwell Publishing.
77
Fairclough, N. (2001), CDA as a method in social scientific research in Method of discourse
analysis Wodak & Meyer: Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London; Sage.
Huntington, S, (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
New York; Simon & Schuster.
Ingram, A. & Dittmer, J. & Dodds, K. & Moisio, S. (2009), “On the Dangers of  Snowblindness
and the “New” Arctic geopolitics” in unpublished seminar paper.
Kefferputz, R. (2010), “On thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North”
Centre for European Policy Studies. <www.ceps.eu>  [retrieved 20.1.2010]
Kerr, D. (1995), “The new Eurasianism: The rise of geopolitics in Russia’s foreign policy.” Pub
lished in Europe-Asia Studies, 47(6), 977–988.
Meyer, M. (2001), “Between theory, method, and politics: positioning of the approaches to CDA”
In: Wodak, R. and Meyer, M.(eds.) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London;
SAGE Publications.
Milliken, J. (1999), “Discourse Analysis in International Relations” Published in European Journal
of IR 5(2) p.225-254.
Moisio, Sami (2003), “Geopolitiikan viisi olemusta” in Harle & Moisio (eds.) Muuttuva
Geopolitiikka. Tampere; Gaudeamus p.17-35.
Neumann I. B. (2008a), ”Russia as a great power, 1815–2007”. Published in Journal of
International Relations and Development (2008) 11, 128–15.
Neumann, I. B.(2008b), Discourse Analysis, in Klotz A. and Prakash D.(eds.) Qualitative
Methods in International Relations. New York; Palgrave Macmillan. p.61-77.
O’Tuathail, G. (1998), “Introduction: Thinking critically about geopolitics.” In G. O´ Tuathail, S.
Dalby, & P. Routledge (Eds.), The geopolitics reader p. 1–12. London; Routledge.
O’Loughlin, J. (2002), “Geopolitical fantasies and ordinary Russians: Perception and reality in the
post-Yeltsin era” Published in Geopolitics 6.
O'Loughlin, Toal & Kolossov (2004), “Russian geopolitical storylines and public opinion in
the wake of 9-11.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies Vol.37,3.
Oldberg, I. (2010), Russia’s Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Stockholm;
Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
Spears, J. (2011), “The Snow Dragon Moves into the Arctic Ocean Basin” Published in:
China Brief. Vol 11 Is 2. pp.12-15.
78
Smith, G. (1999), “Masks of Proteus: Russia, geopolitical shift and the new Eurasianism” Published
in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 24(4), p.481–494.
Torfing, J. (2005), “Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments and Challenges” Published in
Howarth D. & Torfing J. (eds.) Discourse Theory in European Politics. p.1-32
London; Palgrave.
Tsygankov, A  (2003), “Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia’s geopolitical thinking after the Soviet
break-up” Chapter in Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Volume 36, Issue 1
p.101-127.
Widdowson, H. (1995), “Review of Fairclough's Discourse and Social Change.” Applied
Linguistics 16(4): 510-516.
Åtland, K. (2011). “Russia's Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front?” in
Contemporary Security Policy Vol32, Is 2. pp. 267-285
Newspaper Articles
Barents Observer (2010). Northern Federal University officially established 2010-04-07.
<www.barentsobserver.com/northern-federal-university-officially-established.
4767795-16149.html> [retrieved 25.6.2010]
BBC (2000), “The Kursk Disaster: day by day.” 24.8.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/894638.stm> [retrieved 1.2.2010]
BBC (2007) “Russia plants flag under N Pole” 24.8.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6927395.stm> [retrieved 1.2.2010]
CIA World Factbook (2009), Central Intelligence Agency.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html> [retrieved
5.2.2010]
Economy Watch (2010), “Russia Trade, Exports and Imports”17.3.
<www.economywatch.com/world_economy/russia/export-import.html>
[retrieved 5.11.2011]
Ekspert-ural (2008), Vera Stepanova: “Ushs, lutche vy k nam”5.10. <www.expert-ural.com/1-400-
8093/> [retrieved 25.7.2011]
Global Port (2011), ”St. Petersburg – the Sea Capital of Russia” Project webpage <http://global-
port.ru/en/about/> [retrieved 23.8.2011]
Greenpeace (2009), “Wikileaks reveals Arctic could be the new cold war” 12.5. <http://www.
greenpeace.org.uk/blog/climate/wikileaks-reveals-arctic-could-be-new-cold-war-
20110512> [retrieved 25.7.2011]
79
Harding, L. (2009), ’Energy conflicts could bring military clashes, Russian Security Strategy
Warns’ Guardian 13.5. <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/13/russia-security-
strategy-energy-warning?INTCMP=SRCH> [retrieved 11.1.2011]
Itogi (2007) Odnolenko; “Po Volnam” (On waves) 7.5. nro17.
Kommersant (2005), “Spasennyj batiskaf ne spaset glavkoma” 8.8. nro 145.
Kommersant (2008), Skorlygina N. “Sergey Bogdanchikov nyrnul na zolotoye dno” 21.4.
Moscow Times (2011), “2 Brigades of Troops to Protect Arctic” 4.7.
<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/2-brigades-of-troops-to-protect-arctic
/439923.html> [retrieved 1.8.2011]
New Europe (2011), “Putin reiterates Russia’s expansion into Arctic” 3.7.
<http://www.neurope.eu/articles/Putin-reiterates-Russias--expansion-into-Arctic
/107372.php> [retrieved 2.8.2011]
NG (2009a), [Nezavisimaya Gazeta] “Mnogopoljarniy mir stanovitsja vo mnogom pripoljarnym
mirom” 4.6. <http://www.ng.ru/science/2009-06-24/12_mnogopoliarnyi.html> [re
trieved 25.6.2011]
NG (2009b), “V borbe za Arktiku Rossiya sdelala shag vpered” 24.7.
<http://www.ng.ru/printed/228942> [retrieved 25.6.2011]
NG (2011), “Kanada shdet possijskogo vtorshenia”7.4. <http://www.ng.ru/newsng/2011-07-
04/100_obzor040711.html?insidedoc> [retrieved 27.7.2011]
Nord News (2011), “29,9% rossijan gotovy pereehat' zhit' na sever!” 7.11. <http://
nord-news.ru/murman_news/2011/10/07/?newsid=20649> [retrieved 8.11.2010]
Ogonyok (2010a) Natalya Shergina; “Sevmorput” 27.9. No 38(5147)
<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1511280> [retrieved 22.7.2011]
Ogonyok (2010b), Shurenkov, Kudrjavtseva, Sabov & Shergina; “Severniy Sinjanie”
(Northearn Lights) 27.9. No 38(5147) <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1511280>
[retrieved 22.7.2011]
RBK (2008), Podobedova, L.; “Machinations on the Shelf,” 29.5.
<http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2008/04/29/tek/340087> [retrieved 22.7.2011]
RIA (2005), Gibel' atomnoj podvodnoj lodki "Kursk". Hronologiya 12.8. (The loss of the nuclear
submarine "Kursk". Timeline) <http://www.rian.ru/society/20050812/41140663.html>
[retrieved 5.2.2010]
80
RIA (2009a),  “Russia's new Arctic force to focus on border protection” 30.3.
<http://rusnavy.com/news/newsofday/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=7003> [retrieved
26.7.2011]
RIA (2009b), “Podlodki VMF pomogut v opredelenii granits shshelfa RF v Arktike.” 23.3.
<http://www.ria.ru/defense_safety/20090323/165744281.html> [retrieved 1.8.2011]
RIA (2010), “Putin defends Russia's Arctic rights, calls for dialogue” 15.3.
<http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100315/158203547.html> [retrieved 26.7.2011]
RIA (2010a), “Natural resources in the Arctic”
< http://en.rian.ru/infographics/20100628/159604153.html> [retrieved 26.7.2011]
RIA (2011a), “Glavkom VMF: “Mistral” pomogut Rossii postroit okeanskij flot” 31.7.
<http://ria.ru/interview/20110731/409059353.html> [retrieved 1.8.2011]
RIA (2011b), “Rosneft, ExxonMobil sign $3.2-billion strategic cooperation deal”
30.8.2011 <http://en.rian.ru/business/20110830/166306227.html>
[retrieved 1.11.2011]
Rosbalt 2009. “Baltijskij flot obespetsit bezopasnost’ Nord Strem” 19.12.
<www.rosbalt.ru/main/2006/12/19/279497.html> [retrieved 17.10.2011]
Rossijskaya Gazeta (2011), “VMF: Ekonomitseckim interesam Rossii v Arktike ugroshajut strany
Nato” 6.7. <http://www.rg.ru/2011/07/06/nato-anons.html> [retrieved 1.8.2011]
Time (2011), “How Russia is heating up the race for Arctic treasure” 12.7.
<http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2082207,00.html> [retrieved 2.8.2011]
TOR (2009) [The other Russia] “Medvedev signs law on Arctic resources.” 19.7.
<www.theotherrussia.org/2008/07/19/medvedev-signs-law-on-arcticresources> [re
trieved 17.9.2009]
Vomack, Helen [2000], “Putin vows to rebuild Russian military” In Independent 27.8-
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-vows-to-rebuild-russian-
military-711652.html> [retrieved 1.2.2010]
Wikipedia (2011). “Water politics” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water_politics> [retrieved
28.7.2011]
Wikipedia (2011). “Russkij Sever” <http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/?????????????> [retrieved
28.7.2011]
Official papers and strategies
81
Antarctic Treaty (1991), Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Article 2.
<http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolitical/treaty/update_1991.php.>
[Retrieved 12.1.2011]
Arctic Strategy Paper (2008) [Foundations of the state politics of the Russian Federation in the
Arctic for 2020 and beyond] <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html> [retrieved
1.8.2011]
Maritime Strategy of the Russian Federation (2001) [Morskaya Doktrina]
<http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Russian_Maritime_Policy_2020.pdf>
[retrieved 1.8.2011]
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2010) <www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html> [retri-
eved 1.8.2011]
National Security Strategy of Russian Federation (2009)
<http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html> [retrieved 1.8.2011]
Strategy of the Arctic Development and National Security of the Russian Federation (2010)
[Strategy for the Development of the Arctic zone of Russian Federation and ensuring
the National Security until 2020] Ministry of Development of the Russian Federation:
<www.minregion.ru/upload/documents/2011/03/3103/pr_strateg_azr.doc> [retrieved
1.8.2011]
United Nations (1982), Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Part V.
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_overview.htm> [retrieved 11.1.2011]
United Nations (2009), “Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by the Russian Federation”
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm>
[retrieved 19.7.2011]
US Geological Survey (2008), “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil
and Gas North of the Arctic Circle.” <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049> [retrieved
19.1.2011]
Speeches
Medvedev, Dmitry (2009), in Sevmash shipyard 2.7.
<http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2009/07/218889.shtml> [retrieved 25.8.2010]
Medvedev, Dmitry (2010), “Security Council meeting on preventing national security threats
arising from global climate change” 17.3. <http://eng.state.kremlin.ru/face/140>
[retrieved 11.1.2011]
82
Putin, Vladimir (2005), Address to the Federal Assembly 25.4.
<http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2005/04/25/1223_type63372type63374type82634_
87049.shtml> [retrieved 4.10.2011]
Putin, Vladimir (2010), in International Arctic Forum 23.9.
<http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/12304> [retrieved 4.2.2011]
Putin, Vladimir (2001), in Severodvinsk 4.12.
<http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2001/12/28730.shtml> [retrieved
25.8.2010]
Putin, Vladimir (2008), talks with a submarine crew 25.12.
<http://www.mil.ru/848/19267/19295/19294/index.shtml?id=51811> [retrieved
25.8.2010]
